Introduction To The Malayan Campaign History Essay

On 15th February 1942, Singapore, the bastion of the British Empire in the Far East, had fallen. It was the blackest day in the records of British military history. The Malayan Campaign that lasted 70 days of struggle without respite was also the only war that took place in Malaya. Fifty thousand Indian, twenty seven thousand British and eighteen thousand Australian soldiers became prisoners of war [] .

Within five months from the outbreak of war in the Far East, Japan had overrun the South East Asia countries, half of New Guinea, the Marshall and Solomon groups, all the minor isles of the Dutch East Indies and the Andaman. The Japanese had defeated the British and American navies in the naval battles off Malaya and Pearl Harbour. Japan controlled the strategic islands of Hong Kong, Wake and Guam and she was in a position to directly threaten Australia and India. If not because of the Atomic bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese might have extended their invasion towards Australia and West Asia. These were brilliant achievements on the part of Japan, and correspondingly heavy losses for Britain, America and Holland. The Malayan Campaign makes it a thought provoking study by military professionals and the like, in terms of strategies and tactics adopted.

Aim

The paper seeks to provide a critical analysis on the conduct of the Malayan Campaign leading to the fall of Singapore.

Scope

In analysing the conduct of the Malayan Campaign, three areas will be covered; the preparation, the conduct and the post conflict strategic implications on both sides of the conflicting and warring parties. The focus of this paper will be in the following areas:

a. The causes of the conflict and the strategic options available prior to the conduct of the campaign from both sides.

b. The strategic level decision-making process from both sides. The British defence and the Japanese offence preparations.

c. The execution of strategies adopted and the reasons for failures or successes from both sides.

The role of the leadership in influencing the political, social, economic and military factors that affect the campaign from both sides.

The applicability of such military action and strategic principle in today’s military affairs studies.

The influence of political, social, economic and military factors on the outcome of the campaign where applicable and conclusion.

Background and Causes of the Campaign

Prior to World War II, Japan produced only ten percent of her oil requirements and the embargoes on Japanese trade had cut off three-quarters of her overseas trade and 90 percent of her oil imports. These circumstances created the strategic imperative for Japan to secure essential raw materials in the Far East. Meanwhile, the Japanese Army had also stood for a course of expansion. When they gained predominant position in the political life of the nation in 1936, they began to prepare for war [] .

British Preparation and Strategic Level Decision Making

The defence of Singapore was entirely based on the geographical terrain of Malaya given the restricting narrow jungle roads, thick jungles and highly mountainous areas in the northern part of the peninsular and hence would be impregnable to attacks from the north. Therefore, the British assumed that should the attack be launched from the north, it would be impossible for the Japanese to generate sufficient combat forces and the British Army [] would be able to halt any such advance. The British defence planners further deduced that the greatest threat to Singapore was from sea borne invasion, in the form of a surprise attack by a coup-de-main force on Singapore or a landing in southern Malaya [] . These assumptions have led to the fortification of naval base in Singapore and in the event of a conflict, a British squadron of capital ships would sail to Singapore immediately to impede and destroy the enemy. The main immediate objective was then to defence Singapore and the naval bases until the arrival of such fleet.

However, the British were heavily committed with the war in Europe and a great chunk of its resources were deployed in the Mediterranean and Atlantic. Given that resource constraint, the defence of Malaya and Singapore would have to rely on air power. This strategy entails the use of aircrafts to repulse the landing force whilst at sea in order to disrupt any attempts at landings and subsequently attacking enemy forces that manage to get ashore [] . To achieve the defence through air power, an estimated 582 first line modern combat aircrafts were required [] . The strategy of massive utilization of air power strategy was essentially derived from the British experience in Europe. The strategy further entailed that if ground offensive is avoidable, the army would be tasked to protect airfields throughout Malaya and not in the defence of a ground attack on the mainland.

Australia had committed the 8th division whose troops were mostly untrained and ill equipped to the defence of Malaya and Singapore. The equipping and training of the troops was expected to take place in Malaya as the Australians acclimatised to the tropics. The Australians played a significant role in slowing the speedy advance of the Japanese down the Malayan Peninsula in December 1941 and early 1942, even though they had little time for training. There was however a general breakdown among the remaining British forces in Malaya, who retreated back to Singapore.

The plan for the defence of Malaya was codenamed ‘Plan Matador’. The plan was for the Allied troops to seize the port and the aerodromes at Singora and Patani in order to engage the Japanese when they conduct an amphibious landing in the area. This plan calls for an offensive strike into Thailand. However, although Plan Matador appeared logical but it was far from ideal as the Line of Communication was too extensive for the Allied forces and it was further compounded by the bureaucracy from London that made its execution conditional. The restriction from London was however lifted on 5th December 1941. Nevertheless, due to London’s policy of avoiding war with Japan, the operation remains only on paper till the day of the invasion.

British’s Weaknesses and Execution of Strategy

Despite convincing intelligence of the Japanese movements prior to the invasion, it was nevertheless wrongly assumed that Japan would not chance a war with Britain, Holland or the US, and that Russia would still be Japan’s target [] . This assumption has led to complacency in the Allied Forces readiness to confront the Japanese. In this regards, the British truly underestimated the Japanese commitment in the campaign. However, as a form of deterrence, Churchill dispatched the battleship, HMS Prince of Wales, battle cruiser Repulse and an aircraft carrier, Indomitable to the Far East. Unfortunately, the Indomitable had been damaged and was rendered unserviceable and hence the fleet had sailed without adequate air cover. The fate of this task force, code named ‘Z Force’ was determined on 10th December 1941. The Allied forces had no armour, inadequate anti-armour weapons and very limited supplies of artillery ammunition. In the air, facing numerical superiority, the lumbering Brewster Buffaloes were no match for the Japanese Zeros. These weaknesses were due to lack of the strategic commitments by the British Higher Command.

It can be deduced from the above that the planning for the defence of Malaya was a fallacy leading to poor strategy employed in the campaign. The decision to defend the Peninsula using the protection of air and limited naval power and a thinly spread disposition of forces as a result of an extended Line of Communication proved to be a disaster and were unmatched to the Japanese Forces. The conduct of chaotic withdrawals and lack of fighting spirit to counter Japanese tactics and compounded with a profound lack of defences along the coast of Singapore Island clearly reflected the failure of strategy in the higher command. The interwar training and doctrine of the British Army were old-fashioned, dormant and lacked of focus. The development of new strategies to confront new scenarios in the battlefield was left to the imagination and initiatives of lower echelons of brigades and battalions. Tactics employed therefore remained primarily by the book rather than the realities. Although Plan Matador appears logical, it was far from being practical and failed to make any impact due to political and strategic constraints as mentioned earlier.

While the European experience acknowledged the need for air superiority for a decisive battle, British Higher Command did not adequately address it. There was also conflict of interest and lack of mutual understanding between the military and the civilian planners in the administration of Malaya during the period leading to the campaign. The military considered defence requirement and procurement as first priority whereas the civil authorities were more concerned with political and economic aspects. Therefore, inadequate funding was allocated to the military. The Allied forces had failed to optimise the utilization of available limited assets to obstruct Japanese advance and the army was not given enough training in jungle warfare. The failure by the Allies to use the locals especially the Malay because the British believed that the Malays were not a martial race and the Chinese for fear of arming the Chinese Communist had indeed added to the reasons for the failure of the British in the campaign.

British were engaged not only with the Malayan campaign but also with other theatres of war.   This naturally put a heavy strain and drains on her manpower and resources.  Although the British troops outnumbered the Japanese, they were ill equipped for the war.   There was also a lack of adequate air support as illustrated by the sinking of the “Prince of Whales” and the “Repulse” off Kuantan which had left Singapore in the hope of intercepting the invading Japanese forces, but without air cover, proved easy target for the Japanese bombers.   In the case of Singapore, the British had expected a sea-warded invasion and were not prepared for the Japanese conquest through the northern shore of Singapore. The British underestimated Japanese air power while overestimating the RAF in the wake of the Battle of Britain: a combination of intelligence failures, over-confidence and racism. The Singapore strategy was born out of British reluctance to accept second-power status after the First World War. It survived for a generation on a diet of wishful thinking, naïveté, shady diplomacy and a fair dose of “cultural draw back”.

The Japanese Grand Strategy

The Japanese strategy was to simultaneously conduct multiple operations throughout the region in an effort to surprise and confuse the Allies as to their objectives. Once the objectives had been achieved, they would begin consolidating and strengthening to create an impenetrable strategic defence intended to fend off the counterattack by Allied forces. The assumption was that the Allies, operating at the end of long supply lines and without any advanced bases, would be unable to sustain their defence, ultimately relenting to the Japanese in its quest for hegemony in the Far East under the guise of the Japanese “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere [] “.

The Japanese began with the destruction of the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, for it represented the most serious threat to their operations in the region. At the same time, they launched attacks and campaigns throughout the Southern Region, including a two-prong thrust against the Philippines and Malaya. The ultimate goal of the Malaya campaign was the seizure of Singapore to ensure unhindered movement of oil from the Dutch East Indies to Japan, while eliminating what had been to that point the symbol of British power in the Far East.

The Japanese achieved their victory despite having to project power from sea to land, and then being on the attack, with an outnumbered ground force, against a defending enemy, over difficult terrain, in a demanding tropical climate. The victory was achieved because they effectively integrated the combined capabilities of their air, land, and naval forces. As military historian, John Keegan noted: “The perimeter strategy was rooted deeply in the psyche and history of the Japanese who, as an island people, had long been accustomed to using land and sea forces in concert to preserve the security of the archipelago they inhabit and extend national power into adjoining regions [] “.

The Japanese Military Strategy

Arranging Operations.

The Japanese overall campaign plan was finalized by the end of October 1941. Phase 1 would begin with the attack on Pearl Harbour to destroy the U.S. Pacific Fleet, followed almost immediately by landings on the Isthmus of Kra in Thailand and in Northern Malaya in preparation for an offensive on Singapore. Also in Phase 1 were to be the invasion of Hong Kong; air attacks on Guam, Wake and Luzon to cut off U.S. communications, followed by the invasions of Mindanao and Luzon, and subsequently the seizure of Borneo’s oilfields. All of these were scheduled for completion by D+50 [] . Phase 2 consisted of the annexation of the Bismarck Archipelago, the capture of the entire Malayan peninsula and the naval base in Singapore, the occupation of the South Burmese airfields, and moves into the Malacca Passage and Straits of Macassar in preparation for an invasion into the Netherlands East Indies. This phase was to be accomplished by D+100 [] . The final portion was Phase 3, which included the capture of Sumatra and Java and the occupation of Burma, scheduled for completion by D+150 [] . As it turned out, the Japanese took only 70 days to capture the Malayan Peninsula and Singapore, 30 days ahead of schedule.

Anticipation

Japan’s ultimate success in this campaign was directly attributable to its anticipation of the political and military requirements necessary to accomplish its strategic and operational objectives. They were aware of their own strengths and weaknesses, and they worked hard to understand those of the British. Strategically, they realized they could not win a war against a combination of all the major powers in the Far East. They had to find a way to eliminate the ability of one or more of these powers to join a war against them in the Pacific. They eliminated the Soviet Union from any coalition against them through a neutrality treaty in April 1941 [] . That treaty allowed the Japanese to focus on the Southern Region without worrying the threat of the Soviets opening a second front against them in Manchuria or Korea. They also anticipated that the United States might join a coalition of colonial powers to defeat Japan in the Pacific, therefore they considered the U.S. naval and naval-based air power in the Pacific as a vital threat and hence the Japanese attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor.

To ensure a superb intelligence collection in preparation for the Malaya Campaign, the Japanese created the Doro Nawa Unit, known as the “Taiwan Army Research Section.” The 30-member team was tasked to collect all conceivable data connected with tropical warfare in the six months before the commencement of the attack. The area of responsibility was the entire Pacific war region with the budget of 20,000 yen (about 400 $US) [] . The Doro Nawa received open source information from the Southward Association, who had been collecting information about countries in the tropics to effect better trade. Information was also gained from sea captains, mining companies, banking officials, university professors, and private individuals. Open source collection included a secret chart of Indonesia from a captain of a merchant ship who made many voyages to the South Pacific. In another example, a Japanese resident of Malaya gave Doro Nawa aerial photos of Singapore [] .

Thus, the strategy of anticipation had allowed the Japanese to accomplish preliminary actions that set the conditions for success, and enabled them to consistently remaining one step ahead than the Allied Forces.

Centers of Gravity and Decisive Points

The Japanese had identified their naval force as its operational COG because it was crucial to their ability to project power ashore. The deployment of the Japanese naval expeditionary force, embarked on two convoys from Hainan Island to the seaports of Singora and Kota Bharu [] was the first significant operational decisive point. Therefore, to protect the naval convoys, the lines of communication, and the deployment of forces ashore, and to gain air and naval superiority, they attacked the American fleet at Peal Harbour, and later sank the British battle cruiser Repulse and the new battleship Prince of Wales, and eventually destroyed most of the British air forces with bombing raids against British airfields in the region.

Synergy and Leverage

Synergy and leverage are the foundation of warfare. They provide the commander the ability to achieve the greatest effect from all available forces, and integrate and employ force to exploit advantages in combat power across all dimensions. In the Malaya Campaign, the Japanese did a superb job of integrating their air, land, and naval forces to overwhelm the British. This strategy was exemplified during the landings on Kota Bharu, the attack on Parit Buntar, and the assault down the Malaya Peninsula in which the element of total cooperation between the services were highly visible. Once air superiority was gained, the Japanese used their reconnaissance planes and dive bombers to strafe British ground troops and supply columns while using their heavy bombers for long-range attacks on bridges and other objectives.

Thus, the synergy and leverage of air, land, and sea forces allowed the Japanese to gain, maintain, and exploit the advantage against an enemy defending in a subtropical jungle, unimaginable to the British.

Operational Reach and Approach

Operational reach is the ability to support operations over some distance. This strategy allows the joint force commander to establish the operational approach, lines of operations, and sequencing operations in a campaign. In this regard, the Japanese clearly demonstrated the operational reach of their forces by effectively reduced its extended L of C as well as limited sea-based aircraft and poor road and rail networks in Malaya to enable the successful landings at Singora, Patani and Kota Bharu despite the constraint of the monsoon.

Simultaneity and Depth

The strategy of simultaneity and depth is designed to bring the appropriate elements of the force to bear simultaneously against the opponent’s entire structure to the depth of the theatre in order to multiply the combined effects and increase synergy. [] The initial Japanese landings in Thailand and Malaya, accompanied by air attacks against British air bases in Malaya, are some of the best examples of this strategy been employed successfully by the Japanese in the campaign

Balance

The principle of balance refers to the joint force’s posture in that while the forces are committed and held in reserve, they could be decisively engaged and capable of accepting mission changes. The Japanese had decisively applied this principle during the advance throughout the Malayan Peninsula. The technique of massive strikes from unexpected directions had managed to disrupt the British resolve and enabled the Japanese to decimate the defending forces and forced them to retreat.

Timing and Tempo

One of the best examples on the use of the strategy of timing and tempo was during the initial Japanese attack on the Malayan Peninsula. The attack was so swift and well concealed that the initial landings in Thailand and Northern Malaya were conducted before the British had time to execute Operation Matador. Within a few hours of the start of hostilities, the Japanese had over 26,000 men ashore [] .

Culmination

Culmination is the physical or psychological point at which a military force “no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offence or defence” [] . It is usually directly attributable to a physical constraint like logistics or adequate available combat forces, but on occasion can be attributed to vital intangible factors such as morale or the will to fight. In this campaign, the Japanese had expertly applied and exploited nearly all the fundamental elements of operational art although the concept of culmination was less artful. The Japanese planned quick strikes with the intent that all operations would be successfully concluded before British reinforcements could arrive.

Leadership Roles

In any campaign, the leadership role is significant in determining the eventual outcome. The Malayan Campaign is no difference in that the personalities of the military commanders from both warring parties had indeed influenced the strategy and the morale of the troops significantly.

The British Leadership

Lt Gen A.E. Percival

He was appointed to command the equivalent of an army in Singapore. When Japanese army marched all the way down from the north, Lt Gen Percival was supposed to hold the invasion for as long as he could until the arrival of British reinforcement. His conduct of the campaign was such that he failed to take the only two actions that might have given him the time he required to hold back the invasion. First, he failed to concentrate his ground forces in vital areas to meet the main enemy thrust as his forces were at the outbreak of the war, scattered all over Malaya in the defence of airfields. Second, he failed to make every effort to construct field and anti-tank defence at bottlenecks on the north-south lines of communication and to ensure that adequate defences covered the three approaches to Johore Bahru. In addition, Major Gen H.G. Bennet, the commander of 8th Australian Division, did not adequately support him.

The Japanese Leadership

General Tomoyuki Yamashita

Yamashita was a curious and complex man yet highly strung, and immensely talented but often misguided, ruthless and ambitious. Most importantly, he was shackled to the past of the samurai myth, which explained his psyche. [] Yamashita was an able strategist and tactician and was responsible for training the Imperial Army in the arcane arts of jungle warfare and helped to conceive the invasion of Malaya in December 1941. As a strategist and tactician, Yamashita had a good foresight and this was proven in his effective appreciation of the campaign plan for the invasion of Malaya. He anticipated the importance of engineer assets in view of the large number of bridges along the roads linking north and south Malaya. Yamashita ensured that each of his three divisions was supported by their own engineer units and that they were thoroughly trained in bridge building. He effectively made full use of his experience of the campaign fought in China and chose to use only three divisions instead of the five that were offered. This later was to be proven prudent when logistic supplies were running low as the campaign dragged on. Certainly he was regarded both by the Japanese public and by most of the Japanese military as the country’s most gifted commander.

Applicability in Today’s Military Affair Studies

Based on the strength and weaknesses of the warring parties in the Malayan Campaign, their applicability in today’s military affairs studies can be analysed as follows:

Japanese Intelligence

Good intelligence work was one of the chief causes of Japanese success in the initial stage of the war in the Far East. The tentacle of the Japanese secret service began to spread all over the East from the time of the Washington Conference. The Japanese are an intensely patriotic people. Every Japanese businessman was an agent of the Japanese Government. Japan knew the British strength in Malaya. She knew all troop movements in Malaya. She knew all about the military camps. She knew the British supply, ammunition and petrol dumps.

Sound Planning

The smooth success of Japanese armies in the Far East clearly shows that all the campaigns in the Far East had been carefully planned. The Japanese General Staff had paid attention to the smallest details of the different campaigns. They paid special attention to jungle warfare.

Infiltration

The Japanese tactics of infiltration found full scope in the Malayan jungles. As the British do not have planes, they could know very little about the Japanese troop movement. The Japanese on the other hand, knew their disposition. They then sent their troops through the jungle to infilter through the British lines. The Japanese soldiers were specially trained for jungle warfare and were soon adapting themselves to the jungle conditions and turned the jungle into their best ally.

Devolution of Command

Another secret of Japanese success was the devolution of command. In a typical jungle country like Malaya, advances are made along rail tracks, road, paths and plantations. There are large gaps between formations. The Japanese had realized this peculiarity. They then took recourse to the devolution of command. Larger formation was given set objectives and the commander is given the initiatives to achieve his objectives, usually by taking recourse to infiltration. After the achievement of the objectives, the formation was re-formed and new objectives set. The Japanese soldiers showed remarkable resourcefulness by fending for themselves and this necessarily gave birth to initiative.

Coastal Landings

After the sinking of the Prince of Wales and Repulse, the Japanese were undisputed masters in Malayan waters. They exploited this mastery to the fullest. After the fall of Penang the Japanese began to land troops on the coast behind the British lines and threatened the rear and flanks. These tactics forced the British to gave up their lines and withdraw southward to avoid being caught between two Japanese lines. This precipitated their debacle.

Underestimating the enemy

Both Britain and the U.S. made the blunder of underestimating the strength of Japan. They ignored the fact that Japan had been on a total war footing from 1937.The acquisition of Manchuria had greatly helped the expansion of Japanese industries. The growing industries and increasing population made it imperative for Japan to possess secure markets for her goods and sources of raw materials to feed her industries. She needed petrol, tin and rubber and was bound to look for these things in Burma, Malaya and Borneo.

Japan was a regimented country and there was conscript. The Japanese were fanatics. They believed that the highest honour Japanese could get was to die for his Emperor. The Western mind finds it difficult to believe in the existence of such a mentality.

Japan’s air strength was also greatly underestimated. It was also believed that Japanese planes would be far inferior to the British. The Japanese had secretly designed new planes and also borrowed designs from the Luftwaffe. In Malaya, the Japanese used over 600 planes. The British had none to counteract the Japanese.

The main cause of the British debacle in the Far East was the lack of air superiority. From the first minute of the outbreak of hostilities, Japan established undisputed air superiority. The British maintained a very small air force in Malaya. This small force was outnumbered and out manoeuvred by the Japanese from the outbreak of the war.

Sea Power

The fate of any campaign in the Far East must necessarily depend on sea and air superiority. Communications in this area must be sea-communications, because islands and peninsulas must be supplied with men, munitions and material by sea. The Japanese attacks on Malaya were sea-borne. The debacle at Pearl Harbour established Japanese naval superiority from Burma to the Solomon. Her sea communications became safe and she could land troops and supplies all over East Asia.

Operational and Tactical Level

The boldness and relentless commitment of Yamashita are eternal virtues that are also relevant not only in todays but also future wars. Yamashita displayed good foresight and sound tactics by taking every opportunity to make full use of the existing conditions to prevail. As a professional soldier, the overall mission must take precedence over personal grudges and rivalry as evidenced by Yamashita’s conduct during the Malayan Campaign. These virtues enabled Yamashita to succeed in his mission then and similarly it could be applied in todays and future wars.

The weakness of Major Gen Bennett should be taken as an example that ought not to be repeated. First, being part of the Allied forces under the command of Lt General Percival, a British, Bennett should give his fullest co-operation but instead adopt a confrontational attitude. After all, it is the overall mission of the Allied forces that was central to determine the success of the defence of Malaya. Second, Bennett’s lack of charisma and tact in dealing with his subordinates and staff marked his failure in commanding effectively the Australian 8th Division. Thirdly and possibly the most vital aspect was Bennett’s inability to correctly appreciate the Japanese capabilities and tactics that led to his defeat in Muar, where his defence was helplessly outflanked.

Overall Lessons Learned and Applicability

Plan Matador or similar forward defence strategies should be given greater emphasis as the viability in the defence of Malaysia against any likely external aggression is still relevant today. The strategic forward defence of Peninsular Malaysia ought to address the necessity of deploying Malaysian troops into a foreign territory, as already been advocated by some countries. The contributions of local intelligence gathering agencies should be merged into the overall intelligence plan so that whatever information provided by these agencies could be analysed and processed centrally.

The Malayan Campaign exposed a glaring weakness in the co-ordination and co-operation of the three services of the British Commonwealth forces. There was an obvious lack of joint services integration whereby the air, land and maritime resources were not centrally co-ordinated. The Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) should study the lessons learnt from Malayan Campaign seriously. The Markas Angkatan Bersama (MAB) should establish a dedicated and effective joint force command structure to ensure a concerted air, land and maritime operational plan. There must be total ‘joint-ness’ among the three services so that joint operations can be conducted effectively. However, in order for joint operations to be totally effective, inter-service rivalry must be eliminated.

The decisiveness of the Japanese air power in determining the overall success of the campaign is also relevant on present day warfare. Air power is the single most important element in covering the initial landings and subsequent Japanese operations. The subsequent push southwards also saw the effective employment of armour to spearhead the advance. The Japanese have proven wrong, the belief that the Malayan jungle was impassable and not suitable for the employment of such equipment. The ‘jungle phobia’ never existed and was eliminated through correct and proper training as proven by Yamashita’s marauding troops.

Political and Strategic Implications of the Campaign

The fall of Malaya and Singapore proved that the once mighty British and its allies were not so mighty after all. What followed the surrender of Singapore was a period of Japanese rule in Malaya whereby the people of Malaya lived in fear and hardship. This resulted in the formation of the Malayan People Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), which comprised mainly the Chinese. The period of Japanese torture lasted until their eventual surrender in 1945. A significant number of the MPAJA members then formed the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) for their struggle against subsequent British rule. On the political aspect, it confirmed Thailand’s strategy on non-commitment and full cooperation given to the Japanese that allowed their unopposed landings in southern Thailand.

The general hatred of the Japanese was a direct result of their atrocities and this hatred lasted until today. The Japanese felt remorse for their misdeeds after the war and went into policy of non-aggression. This is reflected in their present defence policy of forever renouncing war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of only settling international disputes. The term ‘defensive defence’ has become inseparable from the overall concept of the use of Japanese military power.

Conclusion

The British strategy and defence plan was based upon a sea-borne attack from the south of Singapore, where fortifications were placed and they depended heavily on the American fleets stationed at Pearl Harbour for the protection of their colonies in the East. So confident were the British that they did not see the need to protect the northern shores of Singapore or to train the local people to fight in case of an invasion. Civil defence was also neglected and this resulted in inadequate numbers of bomb shelters, thus resulting in a high casualty rate when the Japanese aerial strikes and bombing of Singapore began. To boost the confidence of the populace, the British’ hyped-up’ the invincibility of the Singapore Naval Base with the arrival in Singapore of the battleships, The Prince of Wales and The Repulse. The people did not realise that the naval base had no aircraft carriers or submarines.

The Japanese, on the other hand, had adequately prepared for the invasion. The Japanese soldiers were trained for jungle warfare; they had equipment, which were well suited to the terrain, such as bicycles and tanks. The Japanese knew that swift movement and mobility was essential for the success of their invasion. Furthermore, the Japanese realised the vulnerability of the British in the north, where there were inadequate defences; the British had wrongly thought that the Malayan jungle was impenetrable. The Japanese therefore decided to attack Northern Malaya, capturing vital airfields and continued their onslaught down the Malay Peninsula into Singapore.

The campaign saw the Japanese practical, superb and cunning application of military strategies, military plans and operations, and also the use of its military doctrines at their best. These were further enforced by the unequivocal support of their political leaders and the people as a whole for the war effort. The attitude, morale and dedication of the Japanese had really transformed them into a war machine that eventually fulfilled all the tasks given to them. Most of all the Japanese had shattered the midst of the invincible white race, which had dominated the thinking of Asians for century.

(5248 words + 654 biblio and footnotes)