Sea Control For Medium And Small Navies History Essay
1. Naval Power is but a part of overall national military power, and a Navy is but a part of maritime power of the state. However, naval power is flexible to an extra ordinary degree and operates in medium quite free of restrictions placed on land and air power [1] . This free medium could become a restriction in certain circumstances, where it could be a boon to one navy, it could be a curse to another.
2. Command of the Sea could be the dream of all navies of the past but in present day, sea control along with power projection would be the ultimate a navy could achieve. With modern technology and advancement of force multipliers like Maritime Reconnaissance Aircraft, AWACS, In-flight Refueling and submarines available with adversaries, sea control is becoming immensely difficult. Even the small navies could possess few of these above mentioned aircrafts or submarines, which could give them sea denial capabilities. A case in point was the Falklands War of 1982 when the British Nuclear powered submarine HMS CONQUERER sank Argentine cruiser GENERAL BELGRANO on second May. This resulted in containment of the remaining Argentine surface forces, including a carrier, which played no further part in the campaign, thereby reducing a major challenge to British Sea Control. However, the loss of HMS SHEFFIELD to missile attack demonstrated the powerful ‘SeaDenial’ capabilities still possessed by Argentine Maritime Air Forces [2] .
3. In describing the ways by which Navies could contribute to achieving national objectives, Admiral Turner wrote that there were two basic missions for a navy, sea control and projection of power ashore. Sea control is defined as relative ability to use the sea for one’s own purpose in specified areas and for specified periods of time and, where necessary, to deny its use to the enemy. As sea control by it self meant nothing unless its establishment led to some effect, the second mission for the US Navy was projection of power ashore or the application of maritime power from the sea to influence events on land directly. Power projection missions ranged from peacetime function of deterrence to combative function of nuclear strikes. The mission for US Navy in the 1980’s was dominated by an emphasis on achieving sea control of the sea. Up to the end of the cold war the threat of the soviet Navy with a strong sea denial ensured that sea control remained clearly a more important mission for the US Navy.
4. The end of the cold war and with it the demise of the single massive threat from the East resulted in shift in focus to new dangers, chief among which is the aggression by regional powers. The role of US forces, in the changed strategic environment, is to be able to rapidly project power to protect vital US interests and defend friends and allies. The US Navy has announced a fundamental shift away from open ocean war fighting on the sea towards joint operations conducted from the sea and that the pre occupation of its Navy in the future will be land control and not sea control. The ability to influence events on land implies that sea control and power projection will cohabit in a different relationship, the fight for control of the sea would be relegated to a secondary concern of US maritime strategy.
5. Pre World War II Britain was the sea power, which could exercise sea control in a theater of their interest. It had a fleet built up around this role with the British ‘cruisers’ being central to sea control. Post World War II this role has been taken up by the US Navy, which has been uncomfortable with the acceptance of this role, forced on it since 1945 by the collapse of the Royal Navy. One proof of this is the fact that US Navy has never built ships for this role, although they came close with Admiral Zumwalt’s sea control ship of 1970’s. There is no functional US Navy equivalent of the pre-war Royal Navy Cruiser [3] . The US Navy has tried to use the aircraft carriers for the role but it has never been the same.
6. It would be difficult for any other nation to exercise sea control, basically because today control of the sea needs immense resources backed by an economically strong nation, which can support its navy. Sea denial has become immensely effective with minimal resources which even smaller navies can afford and hence, the establishment of sea controls even more difficult
CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
Statement of Problem
1. There are regional powers with regional navies like India, Indonesia, Thailand, Brazil, Argentina etc. Their interest in the oceans is constantly on the increase. These navies fall in the category of Medium Powers. They aspire to influence the region in which they exist and protect their interest. They and some smaller navies are acquiring naval hardware to increase their clout. Some out of these, at least the Medium Powers, aspire to have sea control capabilities in furtherance of their national interests. But is sea control viable for medium and small navies?
Justification of study
2. There are Medium Powers and some small power navies who want to be a ‘Blue Water’ force. Some of these medium powers claim to have ‘blue water’ capabilities and desire to exercise sea control in their areas of interests when need arises. But the sophistication of new weapons and modern means of communications have made sea control virtually impossible. A very small navy with the required equipment can put up a strong sea denial measure.
3. The advent of economic powers, fear of sanctions, ratification of UNCLOS III, the wherewithal required in the present circumstances to enforce sea control, the shrinking of defence and naval budgets of nations, the formation of alliances and nuclear deterrence has posed a few challenges to exercising sea control.
Scope
4. An answer to the statement of the problem lies in firstly examining the maritime interests of small and medium power nations and the perceived threats to the security of their interests. And in what ways can these navies expect to provide protection from these threats. This thesis will examine whether sea control is the primary mission of small and medium power navies in the Indian Ocean Region and if it is, then is sea control viable for these navies in today’s International scenario? What are the hurdles in the way of sea control and what are the alternatives to sea control?
5. A considerable amount of literature exists on ranking Navies by their power and capability in to small and medium sized Navy [4] . For the purpose of this thesis, for those nations which maintain a Navy with the capacity to operate primarily within their national EEZ limits but with some abilities to operate beyond the EEZ for the limited duration, will be considered to be small and medium sized Navy and included all Navies in the region.
6. This paper will discuss the medium and small navies with reference to Indian Ocean region.
Operational Definitions
7. Some of the terms used in the dissertation are defined below for better understanding.
(a) Command of the Sea. The ability to use the sea is its entirety for once own purpose at any time and to deny the use of ships to the enemy.
(b) Deterrence. A possible aggressor is deterred if he fails to attack because he assesses that the cost of any aggressive action will outweigh any benefits. Deterrence in a form of coercion it can be generally no specific aggressor or act of aggression is identified, or directed a specific government to deter specific actions. Deterrence can be enacted through nuclear or conventional forces.
(c) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The zone of sea around a state over which it has exclusive rights under international law to exploit economic resources.
(d) Maritime Power Projection. Sea control ensures freedom of action above and below the surface of the sea. The projection of maritime power is the application of maritime power from the sea to influence events on land directly. It exploits sea control to achieve access to the coast and deliver power ashore in the form of amphibious force, organic aircraft’s, and attack weapon and Special Forces. Maritime power projection is a concept that has broad application both during hostilities and for crisis management. In a crisis power projection capability is an important contribution to naval diplomacy providing the principal sea borne instrument for coercion and reassurance. The sailing of power projection forces demonstrate political resolve without a specific statement of commitment. They can poise at sea for long period providing clear evidence of intent and purpose. A maritime power projection force can provide the main or the lead elements for an intervention operation, or a non-combatant evacuation operation, and provide a mobile base for humanitarian or peace support operation. Maritime power projection forces form part of the maritime component of a national expeditionary capability. During hostile maritime power projection forces can used the sea to provide Access to territory that is less accessible by land and air and to apply maneuver from the sea [5] .
(e) Medium Power Navy It is the Navy that does not have the global reach of super powers and therefore lies between `self sufficiency’ and `insufficiency’ which in toady’s parlance comes under category of regional powers. It belongs to a country having necessary economic, industrial, technological and force levels to safeguard national interests but without the capacity to intervene unilaterally beyond their regional boundaries. Medium powers must have the ability to use the sea to benefit their economy, absorb technology and ensure security. The navies of India, Argentina, Indonesia and Iran are typical examples of the medium power navies.
(f) Small Power Navy It is the navy, which has a reach, till the EEZ. It can possibly deny the sea in these areas to intruders and other navies with a considerable amount of success. Singapore navy could be considered as a small power navy.
Method of Data Collection
8. The data for dissertation has been collected from various books, periodicals and magazines and other Defence Books like Jane’s fighting ships. Certain inputs have been taken from guest lectures the Defence Services Staff College has been having from imminent defence analysts and authors.
Organisation of the Dissertation
9. To analyze the statement of the problem and subject under consideration, it is proposed to study the subject in the following manner: –
(a) Sea Control. The size and role of navy, a nation wants to have, would depend upon various factors like :-
Geographical Location
Vital Interests and Threats to These Vital Interests
Dependence on Sea
Energy
Missions for Small and Medium Power Navies
(b) Viability of Sea Control. Is sea control viable for small and medium navies considering the following :-
Economic considerations and shrinking budgets
The emergence of economic powers which are playing a greater role than military
Naval hardware available with Medium and Small Navies
The Laws of the Sea being one of the biggest hindrances
The difficulty in imposing Sea Control
(c) Alternative to Sea Control. There are various alternatives a Nation has to achieve its goals and protect its interests, like :-
Adherence to International Law
Engagement of the powerful nation
Formation of alliances to ensure ‘security’
Use of International Courts and Tribunals to settle disputes
Use of World Opinion and Sanctions against an erring nation
Having a minimum nuclear deterrence
Having a navy with strong Sea Denial capabilities
(d) Conclusion
CHAPTER III
SEA CONTROL
Sea Control
1. Sea control is defined as the conditions in which one has freedom of action to use the sea for one’s own purpose in specified areas and for specified period of time and, where necessary, to deny its use to the enemy [6] . There is likely to be a requirement for sea control across the spectrum of conflict. At the lower end of the spectrum maritime forces may be used to ensure freedom of navigation by deterrent presence in area where illegal acts or constraints are being threatened to merchant shipping. At the highest end it may necessary to use a huge array of maritime power to eliminate its enemy’s ability to challenge sea control over large areas of ocean. The need of sea control is not dependent upon the existence of a substantial threat. If there is any risk to freedom of action, sea control is necessary. If the risk is small the capabilities that will be needed can be correspondingly modest.
Early achievement and retention of the necessary level of sea control will, almost without exception, be a component of any major maritime or expeditionary campaign or operation. However, there can be no absolute guarantee of protection from attack at sea unless command of the sea has been achieved. Sea control must be related to expectable risk. For operations to take place, a working level of sea control must be achieved to provide sufficient freedom of action with in an acceptable level of risk .
If sea control remains in dispute in a certain area, each side will be forced to operate in the face of considerable risk. However, sea control is unlikely to be an end in itself. Rather sea control is necessary to allow use of the sea for further purposes.
3. Sea control comprises control of the surface and sub-surface environment and of the air space above the are of control. The control of air space is only one of degree. The minimum requirement of successful operation is a favorable air situation. Air superiority will be a requirement for sea control where a robust challenge from the air is possible. Air supremacy is a necessary pre condition of command of sea. The geographical extent of sea control may vary from local control around single unit of domination of very large sea areas. In many cases, such as the protection of ports and anchorage’s and for amphibious operations, it must be achieved and maintained up to the shoreline. Indeed maritime forces will often need to maintain air superiority across the shoreline and distance in shore. Because of confinement and congestion, attaining sea control of littoral regions in a more complex task.
Resources Required
4. As per VADM RB Suri , for sea control the Navy needs a task force comprising of one sea control ship, 4-6 frigates/destroyers , One AEW Aircraft and two MR/ASW aircraft in direct support. Weapon and sensors on board should be able to ensure sea control over all area of 200 Kms centered on task force. The task force will also have 2 – 3 SSN submarines to act as anti-submarines screen, if threat from nuclear submarines are to be encountered. Two such forces would be required to operate simultaneously in case of Indian, one Bay of Bengal and the other in Arabian sea. These forces would need backups in addition he also proposes three SSBNs with IRBMs . Submarine force levels recommended are to be twelve.
5. Details of the resources required along with cost for sea control are given below in a tabulated form [7] : –
Requirement of Resources: Force Structure Options
(All prices in crores at 97 level)
Type of Force
Units
Resource Requirements
Remarks
Sea control Task Force (including SLOC’s)
Sea Control Ships 2
Air element 1
Destroyer/Frigates 18
Support Ships 6
4000
1500
11000
1500
(one air element
available from
existing forces)
6 available
Resources shown
For 12
2 available.
Requirement shown
For 4
Strategic Forces
SSBNs 3
4500
Sea Denial Element
SSNs/SSKs 12
9600
Coastal Forces
Corvettes 8
2400
Missile Boats
8
1600
Harbour Defence
SDBs 8
MCMVs 16
ASW Helos 10
800
2000
700
Type of Force
Units
Resource Requirements
Remarks
Defence of Islands
LST(L)/LPD 1 LST(M) 8
Maintenance Reserve
33%
Force Modernisation
Total Requirement
1000
50500
14000
3000
67,500
1LST(L)
available
(excluding SCS
and SSBNs)
6. Can India afford a force structure as mentioned above with astronomical costs? Certainly not in the near future . This holds good for most small and medium power Navy .
Geographical Location
7. Depending whether a nation is bounded by sea and how much sea bounded the need arises for the size and type of the Navy it needs to have. Britain, France and Japan are surrounded totally by sea and have a very rich traditional maritime history. Their majority of the needs are met from the sea. Hence they need to protect their interest from sea which was done by their respective Navies. No doubt all these nations emerged as great maritime powers during various periods of history. Today, despite the emergence of USA as super power, these powers have not been obliviated. They are medium power Navies sufficient to safeguard the interest of their nations. Sea control or sea denial capability of their navies depends upon the above mentioned needs and interest.
8. The scenario in the Indian Ocean today is quite stable. But unlikely to remain so. The maritime boundaries have mostly been defined except in South Asia where both the India – Pakistan and India – Bangladesh borders are yet to be defined . The India – Bangladesh one is difficult to settle owing to geography because Bangladesh has a concave coast and is likely to be boxed in completely by India and Myanmar unless both India and Myanmar make major concessions to Bangladesh which is possible only by strong political governments in both countries . The India – Pak borders can quite easily be settled if the Sir Creek dispute is resolved . Sir Creek was the former boundary between the state of Sind and the state of Kutch . The boundary was drawn with a thick green pen (like the Mcmohan line) along the NE border . The Greek has now shifted its banks and runs along a new alignment . The Indian stand is that we should now take the middle of the channel and Pakistan’s case is that the maritime boundary should start from the Southern bank of the Greek. The difference is about one mile. Since the EEZ is 200 miles deep this involves a loss or gain of 200 square miles . This problem could also be resolved by two strong political government at Delhi and Islamabad . The resolutions of maritime boundaries is important because India is a multi-ethnic state and many of the inhabitants of the islands may have ethnic similarities with the people of neighboring countries.
9. Just two areas dominate the Geo-strategic scenario in the Indian Ocean. South East Asia and the Gulf . South East Asia, for the reason that their economies are growing at phenomenal rates, and these countries are referred to as the new Asian tigers. Their phenomenal growth should not blind us to the geopolitical reality , which is that this area is still dwarfed by the two Asian giants – China and India .
Table – Relative GNP’s ($ billion) [8]
China – 600
Combined South East Asia – 500
India – 450
10. Thus, we see that geopolitical situation in the Indian Ocean region is such that India needs to be a credible naval power and would desire to have a blue water navy with sea control capability.
Sea Denial
Sea Denial is exercised when one party denies another the ability to control a maritime area without either wishing or being able to control that area himself. Sea denial is not a distinct concept from sea control as denial of the enemy’s freedom of action is an aspect of sea control. However the concept is only applicable when full sea control is not exercises by choice or our of necessity. At the operational and tactical label assume of sea denial may be used as part of the outer defence of the force or area, or as away of containing enemy forces. At the strategic level sea denial can be used a guerre de course of sustained attack upon a nations shipping to prevent reinforcement and to shape national morale and the ability to wage war.
CHAPTER IV
VITAL INTERESTS
Vital Interests
1. The strategic concept of a navy is a description of how, when and where the military service expects to protect the nation against threats, and the first step in defining the strategic concept is in examining what interests are considered vital to a small or medium power navy? [9] The core of a state’s national interests, to maintain its existence, as expressed in the United Nation’s Charter is Territorial integrity and political independence. However, in a period of unparalleled economic growth where power and status are being increasingly determined by economic success, a nation’s vital interests can be expanded to include economic success. Maritime strategy of small and medium power is therefore guided by maritime implications of the three basic vital interests, territorial integrity, political independence and economic success.
Dependence on the sea
2. Mahan argued that military sea power grew out of the economic uses of the sea and the importance of those uses to the state [10] . Mahan’s theory can now be
extended to include both the wealth crossing the sea and the wealth from the sea. In 1986, sea borne trade accounted for over 80 percent of international trade by Volume and by weight it was 3.362 million tons, some eight times the amount carried in 1946. In1994 it showed a record figure of 4.46 billion tons [11] . The growth of sea borne trade in recent years is dramatically reflected by the increased container traffic. The container traffic in the period 1980-92 in Hong Kong, the top world container port, increased fivefold while Singapore in number two slot recorded an eight fold increase in the same period [12] . The growth of maritime trade signifies that medium and small power countries are more dependent on sea borne trade. For example Singapore’s trade is 323% of its GDP annually, Australia’s is worth 27% India’s is worth 22%, Malaysia’s is worth 121%, the Philippines’ 41% and Indonesia’s 35% [13] . Oil is by far the largest item of sea borne trade between countries. While oil producing states are specially dependent on sea borne trade, some of the developing economies with rapid increase in consumption of petroleum products are more dependent on oil. India is a particular example, in 1998 she imported 37% of her oil requirement and by 1993 her imports had risen to 56% [14] . It is predicted that import of crude oil by sea to Asia will rise from 55% to 67% in 2000 [15] .
Foreign Trade and Its Protection
If we take 1994 as the datum year, India’s GNP in dollar terms comes to 290
billion. the exports and imports totaled 50 billion which came to 16% of the GNP – this calculation shows how much of the country’s wealth every year transits the seas. The protection of foreign trades as being one of the primary duties of the navy is and old concept . Many Navies treat this as their bread and butter . Perhaps not many are aware that in the 1971 war the value of Pakistan I ships and cargo that were captured amounted to Rs 200 crores at 1971 prices and looking back at that war after 25 years, it seems to be the only profit we made, despite the overall victory.
4. The total value of India’s foreign trade is quite small compare to the percentage it occupies in countries like China and Korea where it is around 40 – 44%. India’s GNP is growing at the rate of 6 – 7 %. By any modest extrapolation the present value of foreign trade which amounts to 150,000 crores will grow to 200,000 crores by the year 2000. In Naval jargon this roll which is called the protection of SLOCS or sea lanes of communications , requires an investment that is proportionate to the wealth being protected . It is enough that we protect our merchant marine – for that today only 299 ships . They carry about 20 –25 % of all the cargo that comes in and goes out . The remaining 75% is carried by foreign cargo carriers . During war , much of the foreign shipping will not be available to us. Those ships that agree to visit zones of war will charge enormously high rates of insurance and cargo carrying charges, where the loss in a months war could be hundreds of crores [16] .
Energy
5. We looked at the overall effects of trade vulnerability earlier, but there is a need to focus on war CIA calls single commodity vulnerability. The CIA very kindly published a hand book annually listing such single commodity vulnerability and does not see any particular vulnerability for India on account of energy imports. We need to look at this aspect a little more closely.
6. In the late eighties we appeared to be moving towards some self sufficiency in oil because domestic consumption was not rising, where as for off shore oil production was . since 1990, Bombay High , our only world class oil field has steadily declined in productivity until with the injection of new recovery technology, we have regained the same level of production as earlier but domestic oil consumption has been steadily rising and if economic is further liberlised our; consumption is expected to rise. In any case, the growth of consumption will not be less than production. Thus the gap between production and imports has been widening steadily until with liberlisation it may go out of control . The key figure is by the year 2000 we may be importing 1.5 million barrels or 11 million tons per year
7. The growing concerns over the dwindling land based resources are placing more demands on the use of the seas as a source of food, energy and raw materials. Fish is a major source of the world’s supply of animal protein and for developing nations it is the only supplement the developing nations it is the only supplement to rice or maize. It is assessed that by the year 2000. four fifths of the world population will be living in underdeveloped countries and 75% of them will be within 300 miles of the sea [17] . The seabed of the ocean is also depository of minerals. India is one example of a country that has been allocated a site of 150,000 square kilometers in the Central Indian Ocean for deep-sea mining as a pioneer investor. With technological developments making seabed mining possible and the fact that the seas have extensive areas for mining not under the sovereign rights of any coastal state, exploitation of seabed resources will be of potential concern to many countries.
Sovereignty
8. The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the sea has established the extent of territorial sea to 12 nautical miles and of the Exclusive Economic Zone to 200 miles and within the maritime responsibilities of nations has vastly expanded. Along with the added responsibilities the law has also provided room for boundary disputes. Territorial integration at sea has economical, legal, diplomatic, and military dimension to it. Given the economical potential of the sea it would be in order to state that offshore sovereignty is as much a concern to medium and small powers as is maintaining territorial integrity.
Threats to Vital Interests
Medium and small power nations are not self sufficient in key strategic and economic commodities and are dependent on their vital imports. Sea borne trade is the lifeline for these nations needs to be protected. Although there are no significant military threats to the economic use of the sea, there exists a possibility that non-
military threats such as piracy may end in requirement of military intervention. In 1994 there were 100 piracy incidents reported world over, a 15% increase over 1994’s tally, of which 60 were in Asia and Pacific region [18] . Societies are increasingly vulnerable to the threats from drug and arms smugglers as well as illegal immigrants. The smuggling of plastic explosives used in the devastating blasts in Bombay, India in 1993 is a case to the point There is a growing concern for the protection of trade in small and medium power countries, being demonstrated by the building of national flag shipping fleet and the capability for their protection by some of these countries. In 1994, Indian ships carried 25% of India’s imports and exports and it was planned to raise the capability to 50% [19] . The number of vessels under the national flag of Indonesia rose from 1122 in 1980-81 to 1884 in 1991-92 and the corresponding increase for some other nations in the same period are, Malaysia 489 ships in 1991-92 from 196 in 1980-81, the Philippines 1420 ships in 1991-92 from 620 in 1980-81. While increased labour costs in developing economies have steered those countries away from increasing vessels under own flag, these countries too feel the need for protection of sea borne trade as an essential element of their security. The growing concern for maintaining good order at sea is reflected by the restructuring of navies; of the 1700 or so naval vessels likely to be built over the decade the majority will be coastal patrol vessels, 70% of which will be going to Asian or NATO navies. The conduct of intensity anti terrorist operations in the Indian waters has stretched the resources of the Indian Coast Guard and the Navy to an extent that the Government has directed the navy to build smaller ships.
10. Some of the examples of disputes concerning offshore sovereignty are the Spartly Islands in South China Sea, the boundary disputes between Thailand, Combodia and Vietnam, Sipidan Ligitan Islands involving Malaysia and Indonesia and the Chinese military build up in Mischief Reef (belonging to the Philippines). The potential of these disputes resulting into military conflicts cannot be stated with certainty but since minor skirmishes have involved the navies , such disputes can be of great security concern. The build up of military structure by China in the Mischief Reef and the subsequent seizure of 62 Chinese fishermen by the Philippine Navy illustrate the likely involvement of the military in territorial disputes [20] . Maritime capability of Navies in the Asian and Pacific region.
The role and force structure for a navy has to be based on estimates of possible adversaries. The increase in defence spending in the region reflects that even the so called small navies are building up their maritime capability. With increasing prosperity and the realisation of their dependence on the sea, small and medium powers in the region are focussing on qualitative improvement to their force capability ( excluding nations such as Sri Lanka, Myanmar and the Philippines who are faced with economic difficulties). Primarily, replacements of aging platforms and development of submarine capability have taken priority. Singapore has acquired a submarine and is building operational expertise. Thailand and Malaysia are seeking to procure submarines; Pakistan is replacing its aging submarines with more modern submarine capable of firing anti-ship missiles. Surface ships are being fitted with the most popular missiles like the Harpoon and Exocet.While these are only indicative of weapon and platform, force capability determinants such as support infrastructure, logistics and command and control structure are yet to be developed to a level to give any of the small navies any decisive technological edge over its neighbours.What these navies have essentially developed is a sea denial capability and in case of a conflict can raise the risk to a stronger adversary attempting power projection task. Undertaking tasks such as tactical bombardment by aircraft from carriers, as demonstrated in the Indo -Pak war in 1971,will now require overcoming the strong sea denial capability of the adversary.
12. Some of the navies in the region undoubtedly have the power projection assets in the force structure. Does that mean those medium powers in the region are primarily concerned with power projection capabilities? The Indian navy currently posses the amphibious capability to land about 2000 troops and about 80 armoured vehicles and its capability is grossly lacking for even conducting operation against the smallest of Indian Ocean states. Even if India were to develop a capability to project `power to help friendly states located at a distance’, the navy’s preoccupation with constabulary duties and the growing awareness of the public to curb defense spending will rarely provide the resources for anything but the smallest of contingencies [21] . Given the extent of Australia’s maritime surrounds and constraints of defense budget, the Royal Australian Navy will be preoccupied with retaining a technical edge in capability. At best the RAN can support a regional role, to bring credibility to Australia’s national policies and defensive postures. The power projection assets of IN and RAN would however be required in defensive roles of protection of their offshore territories such as Andamans and the Cocos Island respectively. Despite reductions in defence spending, the Japanese Self Defence Force is the world’s largest and most capable navy. Inevitably, Japan’s national interests may mean operating beyond the current 1000 miles limit, but her dependence on imports by sea of energy resources and other strategic resources will require her navy to primarily protect her sea lanes of communication. The limited power projection capability that the navies in the region maintain stems from the argument that it provides a wide range of responsive actions [22] . For medium powers force projection capability will be largely restricted by sustainability, the capacity of a force to sustain itself at sea. Sustainability requires well-developed support and logistics infrastructure, which pose additional constraints on the limited resources of a medium power. Threat assessments of medium powers are based on possible scenarios of military conflict with a weaker or a stronger adversary. Against the weaker adversary, a medium power will have to contest control of the sea to be able to project its power ashore and given the proliferation of capable weapon systems and development of the sea denial capability, the medium power will be primarily concerned with gaining control of the sea. When faced with stronger adversary, the medium power will need to assert control of the sea to protect its vital interests and a strong sea control capability will deny the adversary force projection capability.
CHAPTER V
MISSIONS FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM POWER NAVIES
1. The role for a navy describes the manner in which it expects to protect the nation’s vital interests against perceived threats. Contemporary strategists have described three roles for the navies in future; military, constabulary and diplomatic. What missions do the small and medium power navies in the region need perform in fulfilling their roles?
2. Since the economic use of the sea is vital to survivals, the navy will be tasked to protect economic use of the sea both during peace and war. In fulfilling such tasks the navy will have to provide credible deterrence to threats such as piracy, illegal acts against shipping and illegal use of the resources of the sea. The protection of economic use of the sea range from providing deterrence to actual elimination of the adversary’s ability to interfere with one’s own use of the sea. The very fact that a risk of threat exists requires navies to exercise a degree of sea control to secure one’s own use of the sea. Navies are called upon to protect the nation’s sovereignty and in peacetime situations involves policing roles, which may be performed in conjunction with other organisations of the nation (such as the Coast Guard). Since disputes over territory may involve the military, the navies of small and medium powers are required to exercise control over the concerned area of the sea. During times of a war a small or a medium power navy may require to seek control of the sea to move troops, or support land and air operations. When faced with a less serious adversary the small or medium power navy still needs to overcome the threat to the use of the sea by the growing sea denial capability of its adversary. On the other when faced with the more serious adversary the small and medium power navy can raise the risk to the adversary’s use of the sea.
3. Do small and medium powers in the region not require any power projection capability? The need to defend offshore territory may involve tasks such as securing selected facilities to prevent enemy use of them and conducting land attack in support of sea control. The tasks stated involve power projection missions, however the projection of power will need a degree of sea control. Small and medium power navies in the region will need to strike a balance between maintaining a wide range of capability as may be possible and their limited resources.
CHAPTER VI
VIABILITY OF SEA CONTROL
Economic Consideration
1. All most all the nations of Indian Ocean region, be it a regional power with medium power Navy or a small power Navy, are developing countries. The nations as such are putting a lot of emphasis on economic development of the state. The world order is such that if a nation wants to grow economically it has to listen to the dictates of international monetary funds and other financial institutions like World Bank.
2. The dictate from IMF and World Bank to all developing nations has been to reduce the defence spending. Most of these nations do not have a choice as they are heavily depending on borrowing from these two bodies. They have to oblige and cut down their defence spending and in turn reduce the share of naval budgets. Navy world over are a capital intensive and have long gestation period. The hardware becomes obsolete very soon and needs upgradation .
3. Indian Navy’s budget for the year 1997 – 98 is disappointingly low in capital formation. Acquisition and mordernisation of force levels is depeted by the capital budget . A trends for Indian Navy show that the capital budget is insufficient and declining for last two years and if one caters for inflation in Military hardware costs than it is abysmally low . Capital budget for last few years is given below:-
Year Capital Budget (In Crores)
1993- 94 1,363
1994 – 95 1,496
1995 – 96 1,980
1996- 97 1,938
1997 – 98 1,897
4. Sea control needs a large inventory of modern naval hardware. The costs of ship and Aircraft have gone up more than four times in last two decades. With the capital budget as shown above , it is unimaginable to maintain a blue water force which can exercise sea control in a theatre of its liking.
Naval Hardware Availability
5. Most of the small and medium Navies do not have hardware required for sea control . Specially to present day capability of nation’s to provide viable sea denial to the best of Navies.
6. The 1982 Falklands campaign required sea control to be established by United kingdom at a distance of 8,000 miles for a period of two months. During this time the Navy had to destroy enemy Airforce, defeat the enemy Navy, conduct amphibious landing , maintain a supply line and perform multiplicity of normal wartime tactical tasks. To accomplish such a task the British needed huge Task Forces. They went into the campaign with TF 317 with the carriers and amphibious forces and TF 324 with Nuclear power Submarines.
7. Sea control requires forces such as sea control ships with integral air,destroyers/frigates supported by AEW and MR/ASW shore based aircraft. In addition , submarines of SSK/ SSN type are deployed to escort the task force against nuclear submarines .
Economic Power
8. Economic power is almost elusive term as power itself. It comprehends by far the largest manifestation of vigour in most nations. An economy such as Japans has had a great deal of power in precisely the terms of definition. it really does influence events in its effect world markets, on levels of expectation , on the weight given to Japan in world counsels.
9. The economy place a greater roll in today’s world affairs and is considered more potent than military power. Economic sanctions can break the backs bone of a nations and subdue its military to compromises of all sorts Iraq has been a typical example of subjugation of military power to the economy sanctions. The US and its allies enforce their will and decisions with impunity in Iraq despite, Iraq having a credible military force reasonably good power in the middle east.
10. On the other hand is the example of Kuwait, which due to its economic power, having the most needed energy source in the world called Petroleum, had brought the wrath of all developed countries on Iraq. Iraq is still paying the price for its adventurism of 1990-91 when it occupied Kuwait in a blitzkrieg type of operation.
11. Japan has a strong economy and fairly powerful navy. But, its military forces have been restricted in their role as defensive forces. However Japans clout in the World Affairs is well known. Specially when we take the case of medium powers, most of which are developing nations, they can not afford to antagonize the Japanese. It is a dominating force in the economic world.
12. Most of the nations and their leaders depend on the economic development for the stability of the state. An economic slow down today can put many nations in disarray as it happened in South East Asia. These nations are facing tremendous social, political and racial problems after the collapse of their economies. Here Japan has come to their aid with massive economic bail out package. None of these nation states can think of developing a conflict with Japan. That is economic power.
Laws of the Sea
13. One of the biggest hurdle for seas control has been UNCLOS III. It has been given sovereign rights to all coastal states to an area of 12 nautical miles from the base line called the territorial waters. It has further given the states 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone from the base line. On one side it has sunk the free oceans and on the other it has increased the economic area of the nation state. As a result there is a new vigour to increase the shape and size of there respective Navies to protect this new found wealth. The EEZ in India itself is 2.2 Square Kilometers. Oceans have become a hub of economic activity and a sizeable amount energy requirement and majority of trade comes from the oceans.
14. The presence of neutral shipping, a sizeable number belonging to large economic and Military powers, traverse the seas. They happen to be a big hindrance to exercising of sea control . Since destruction of one of these neutral s can bring the world opinion against the nations . The UNCLOS III emphasises on the protection of neutral and free flow of trade.
Imposing of Sea Control
15. Total sea control has become a thing of the past. The British could do it pre-World war II. But with the advent of modern and extremely capable submarines , aircraft , LRMP Aircraft this tasks has become extremely difficult. Even for the super power like USA, It would be difficult to have sea control for longer periods. The US Navy is using more of alliances and bilateral treaties to further its cause than exercising sea control directly. Even a small Navy with an affordable array of submarines LRMP aircraft and stand of missiles is capable of denying sea to a well equipped Navy .
16. During Falklands War in 1982, the British nuclear powered submarine HMS CONQUEROR sank Argentine cruiser GENERAL BELGRANO on second May. This resulted in the containment of the remaining Argentine surface forces, including a carrier, which played no further part in the campaign, thereby reducing a major challenge to British Sea Control. However the loss of HMS SHEFFIELD to missile attack demonstrated the powerful sea denial capabilities still possessed by Argentine Maritime Air Forces. Further more the remaining Argentine submarines posed a residual threat as a ‘fleet in being’ and it was necessary to constantly devote much time and effort to anti-submarine protection.
CHAPTER VII
ALTERNATIVE TO SEA CONTROL
Adherence to International Law
“Member states shall settle their inter-nation disputes by peaceful means , shall refrain from the threats or use of force by any state”.
UN Charter
1. In a world where economic capability is becoming an important determinant of national power the utility of military force is declining as the cost of military solutions has rapidly grown while the benefits have gone down. Small and medium powers find that it is in their basic interest to avoid military conflict, mainly for the reason that war is too costly. Even the US realizes the enormous effort required to achieve a limited victory in securing the liberation of Kuwait. Many nations realise that international law should be guiding spirit of both peacetime and wartime policies. The war in Kuwait provides yet another example; even in the most clear cut case of aggression by Iraq the US had to engage a Coalition under the international law to support a military offensive. By adhering to international law small and medium power nations can hope to secure domestic and international support for their policies. The exercise of military power by small and medium power nations will be much influenced by the UN charter that forbids the use of force, justifiable only in exceptional circumstances. After a war, a small navy or medium power can garner international support for its position if it waged war in accordance with criteria for just war. Therefore from the point of view of adhering to international law, force projection capability except when used in a defensive sense, will not be in the better interest of small and medium power nations.
2. The problem medium or small power nation is always faced with is, how much of its limited resources can it allocate to its military service? These powers lacked the resources to further their interests solely through their own independent action and have depended on their more powerful allies, by making few concessions for their protection. With the end of the cold war and the demise of the Soviet threat, the necessity for the US to maintain forward bases has declined considerably. Faced with growing pressures on the economic front the US expects its allies to share more of their security burdens. While the demonstration of gunboat diplomacy by the US off Taiwan showed the US Navy’s role in maintaining peace, the decline in the fleet strength will make it very hard pressed for the US to go on demonstrating its global presence. Similarly nations that were dependent on the USSR for direct or indirect military support are now required to fend for their own security. Concurrent with the need to protect their own interests, the rapid growth of some economies has given them resources to build up their military capabilities. Medium and small powers are increasingly concerned over their security structures that make maximum use of all means of power to keep the levers of control over their destinies in their own hands. For small and medium powers it implies that they have to exercise a strict discipline in allocating resources for developing the military force structure and yet be able to retain a range of capability. Underlying the change in world order, is the fact that small and medium powers are now themselves responsible for protection of their vital interests
Engagement
3. The latest theory of that if a nation is too powerful then instead of confronting it, engage it constructively. This is what the South East Asian nations are doing with China. They all have the fear and threat of China. The South China Sea is presently a prospective flash point between China and a number of South East Asian nations. The south East Asian countries can not take on the military might of China. So they have involved china with a policy of engagement through trade. They have increased their economic stakes in each other in such a way that a conflict with each other would be prohibitive.
Alliances
4. Alliances are to best alternative to reduce defence pending on defence forces. An alliance of small powers can utilise each other’s military hard ware collectively to take on any power. This is how the security needs of smaller and medium power was met in the past. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, WARSAW PACT, CENTO, FPDA are some examples of the alliances of the past. Ironically only NATO still survives in to a fully functional alliance.
5 The European nations which are part of NATO have been able to reduce military hardware and size of force due to guarantee for security of their interest from the alliance. Britain which was a major power Pre-WW II is now only a medium power because it needs are met in NATO which is a major power now.
6. The countries of South East Asia have been welcoming the presence of US Navy in Indian Ocean and South China sea to counter the threat from the China. India, though it was non- aligned , had the backing of the erstwhile Soviet Union to guarantee its national interest and look after its security needs.
International Courts and Tribunals
7. Various disputes can be solved through international Courts and Tribunals . This naturally obliviates the use of military power and thus Naval force to a large extent.
8. Most of the nations states who are busy building their economies would prefer to take this part. It would reduce pending and the money saved could be utilised for social and economic developments. Unless the threats is so overwhelming that there is no solution likely through International courts and tribunals, the nation would go to war. Or the differences are on strong ideological grounds.
9. International Courts and Tribunals are a much cheaper and a constructive method of settling disputes. Military means diverts a nation from its intended development path and the cost are very high.
Use of World Opinions and Sanctions
10. Mobilising the world opinion for the nation which has been wronged is a very powerful tool . A case in point was Kuwait which has a very small defence force but the world opinion not only imposed sanctions against Iraq but a coalition of countries used military to throw out the Iraqis from Kuwait. It did not end there Iraq had to pay damages to Kuwait and the coalition forces.
Deterrence
11. Deterrence capabilities is another alternative to sea control capability but it may not be economically viable. India and Pakistan have bulldozed their ways as nuclear power which gives them the nuclear deterrence capability. Nuclear deterrence is a very expensive preposition as a nuclear weapon itself is a very cheap compare to the cost of command & control and delivery systems.
Sea Denial
12. Sea denial is the most affordable option for small and medium power Navies. This capabilities can be enhanced even with the present day budget constraints for defence. The hardware required for this purpose is some shore based maritime aircraft and good model submarines which are silent. Pakistan has developed a very strong sea denial capability to counter Indian Navy. Their surface force is negligible but it has a good fleet of maritime reconaissance aircraft and strike aircraft. It is modernising its submarine fleet with new acquisitions . Her Naval aim is very clear. She knows that building a Navy for sea control would be very expensive and it can not afford it with the present financial crunch. So , she has gone in for strong sea denial capability which falls in line with her national aim.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
1. The vital interests of small and medium power nations in the Indian Ocean region are protection of sovereignty, political independence and economic progress. The nations of this region are largely dependent on the use of the sea; for food, raw materials and energy for their survival and sea borne trade for their continued economic progress. The security environment in the region is not benign, disputes occur over off shore territory. There are threats to the economic use of the sea, piracy is rearing its ugly head threatening the safety of shipping. Some nations are concerned with the low intensity conflicts such as prevention of spread of terrorism from the sea. The navies in the region are increasingly involved in constabulary function of maintaining good order at sea.
2. Economic progress in the region has spurred defence spending, with smaller navies building up maritime capability. The development of maritime capability of small and medium power navies is directed towards raising the risk of any adversary’s military adventurism. For medium power force projection capabilities are largely restricted by sustainability, their resources do not permit building up of large infrastructure to support power projection. Small and medium powers benefit from adhering to international law governing waging a just war as they can garner international support for their cause. This means that development of power projection capability will not be in their interest. Naval tasks range from providing a credible deterrence to threats preventing own use of the sea to actual elimination of the threat. Certain naval tasks involve power projection capability, such as in support of land operations, but the magnitude of such tasks will not justify allocation of substantial resources. The interests that small and medium powers in the Indian Ocean region have in the sea and the threats that exist to those interests requires a limited sea control capability if the nation can afford and certainly a good sea denial capability.
3. For India the position is most appropriately put by Vice Admiral SP Govil in his article ‘Indian Navy-Its Shape and Size’, as:-
‘At the out set it needs to be made clear that India does not need a navy designed to project power . A power projection navy is for nations which have defence commitments out side their shore. What India needs is a medium size blue water navy which will deter aggression and safeguard our maritime interest in our region, and since we do not belong to an alliance, what ever we wish to defend has to be done all alone by ourselves. This naturally calls for a different kind of preparedness where cost necessarily escalates. The shape and size of our country and the location of our island territories compels us to deploy our naval units in two or three distinct groups/task forces but there is no doubt for some time to come that North Arabian sea will continue to be the area of our focus for us’.
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