The Concept Of Asia Pacific History Essay

1. In the Global politics, Asia Pacific is confronted with many challenges. It’s a region in which the United States, China and Japan relate directly to one another. The United States is still a dominant power in the region, since post 1945 period, whereas, on an ambitious plan of economic modernization since late 1970s, China has grown steadily stronger. Are China and the United States on a collision course? Is US new Asia Pacific as a “pivot” or “rebalancing” is to contain China? or can they cooperate to bring permanent peace not only in the region but in world? Where does Japan, the world’s second largest economic power, fit in this frame? Japan has maintained its alliance with the United States, while also developing a more independent direction; but it does not wish to see the region dominated by China. Tensions have continued throughout the early twenty-first century in relation to both Taiwan and Korea. Are these tensions likely to result in war at some point? In Southeast Asia the various states have faced numerous “nation building” challenges, none more so than Indonesia.

2. Many groups oppose the authority of the existing states, and these tensions often spill over into the international arena. Throughout Asia Pacific one can also observe the expanding presence of regional and global organizations. The usual characterization of “Asia Pacific,” includes East Asia and the Western powers of the Pacific (Australia, United States, Canada and New Zealand). East Asia can be separated into Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Northeast Asia covers China including Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia (Far East or Pacific Russia) and Mongolia. Southeast Asia includes Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, East Timor and Vietnam. Except East Timor, Southeast Asian countries are all members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Whereas New Zealand and Australia are the major powers of the South Pacific, the entire Pacific islands region comes within a definition of Asia Pacific. Together with Australia and New Zealand, the independent and self-governing island states constitute the Pacific Islands Forum, the prominent island states are Papua New Guinea and Fiji. The Pacific seaboard countries of Latin America i.e Chile, Mexico and Peru are members of APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation). India also interacts with Asia Pacific in various ways.

Historical Context

3. The concept of Asia Pacific dates backs to 1960s, as a means of linking East Asia to the wider Pacific region duly promoted by countries like United States, Japan and Australia. “Asia Pacific” highlights the Asian dimension in a way that “Pacific region” does not. US support has been a major factor in enabling the concept to become established. However, from a political perspective the United States cannot portray itself as an Asian power but its extensive involvement in the Pacific justifies describing it as part of Asia Pacific. Pacific-oriented Western countries such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, although they do not carry the weight of the United States, have similar reasons for supporting the construct. Japan an important factor behind its support was that while the concept provided a justification for continued US involvement in East Asian affairs, this also meant that if tensions arose in US-Japanese relations, there could be a possibilities for defusing such tensions in wider regional settings.

4. As the term “Pacific region” does not contain any specific reference to Asia, the major alternative regional construct has been “East Asia,” which excludes Western powers such as the United States. From the late 1980s, the main advocate for same was former Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Mahathir Mohamad. In 1989, although Malaysia became a member of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Mahathir’s preference was however, for an East Asian Economic Grouping or Caucus. The “East Asian” approach received a fillip at the time of the Asian economic crisis in 1997, with the subsequent emergence of members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, together with Japan, China and South Korea (ASEAN + 3). In December 2005, a new grouping, known as the East Asia Summit, emerged following a meeting in Kuala Lumpur.

5. The major powers of Asia Pacific i.e: United States, China and Japan are particularly engaged in Northeast Asia. The other significant subregion is the Southeast which include Australia, Indonesia, Russia, Taiwan and N & S Korea. Regional organizations play a significant role in giving substance to the Asia Pacific concept. While the focus in this research is on the contemporary era and the recent past but few of the issues we will discuss, have deep historical roots. Hence it is appropriate to provide an overview of the historical context in terms of the following phases:

a. The era of traditional civilizations.

b. The era of imperialism.

c. Traditional Civilizations (1945-1989 period).

Era of Traditional Civilizations

6. Contemporary Asia Pacific system of states is based on the Westphalian model developed in Europe in 1648. The shift to this model resulted from the impact of Europeans in the region, but the Westphalian system was not the prevailing model historically. China was the dominant force in Northeast Asia, developed as a distinctive civilization over a period of thousands of years. Although there were periods of conflict and division within China, however, the Chinese civilization made significant contributions in the development of bureaucracy (the mandarin system), science and technology, arts, agriculture and industry, commerce and philosophy. The writ of the Chinese Emperors ran wide, as many leaders of countries like Korea and Vietnam were also required to pay tribute to the Emperor. China had the dominant cultural influence in the development of Japan, which was following a policy of isolating itself from the outside world as much as possible. Hence Japanese civilization developed along its own lines; Japanese rulers did not pay tribute to China. In the Chinese view of the world, people living beyond its civilisation influence were characterized as barbarians. In Southeast Asia the situation was even more complex. No single empire dominated Southeast Asia, while China has an important influence in the northern part of Southeast Asia, particularly in Vietnam, Indian civilization also had a major impact. The term “Indo-China” originally covered the whole of mainland Southeast Asia and reflected the dual influences. Hinduism and Buddhism in Southeast Asia derive originally from India. Cambodia (Angkor) was one Southeast Asian empire where the influence of Indian civilization was strong. The survival of Bali as a predominantly Hindu island within a largely Muslim Indonesia is a reflection of earlier Indian influence. Traders brought Islam to maritime Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Southern Philippines) from about the thirteenth century.

The Era of Imperialism

7. The extensive European involvement in the region begins from the fifteenth century, the Europeans were particularly interested in trade so they established cooperative relationships with local rulers, and the missionaries also became involved in some areas. To achieve political control, European access was through mercantile companies such as the Dutch United East India Company (VOC), they also established Trading centres and forts in some regions. Portugal was the earliest European power to become involved in the region, the Spice Islands (later known as the Moluccas or Maluku), Malacca (in modern Malaysia) and Macau (China) were important Portuguese centres. Spain extended influence in the Philippines only.. Netherlands took control of Netherlands East Indies (modern Indonesia). The Dutch were the only outsiders who had access to Japan after 1639, with a settlement at Nagasaki. The British and French were active in the so-called Far East. The greatest external pressure on the existing international system in East Asia occurred during the nineteenth century in different forms, in Northeast Asia the imperialist powers generally sought domination without much emphasizes on the acquisition of territory, to ensure the achievement of strategic and economic objectives. The changing situation was most obvious in relation to China especially from the time of the Opium War (Britain and China-1842), China was forced to make a number of concessions to Western powers through a series of unequal treaties (e.g Hong Kong). Western powers established spheres of influence in different regions of China. The United States pursued an open-door policy with the aim of giving all external powers equal access to China. Russia put the most emphasis on territorial expansion at China’s expense.

8. In Northeast Asia, Japan was also subjected to strong Western pressures, but the outcome there was very different from that in China. Japan took various steps and strengthen its political and economic system resisted Western influence and achieved remarkable success in this respect. By the end of the nineteenth century Japan had joined the Western powers in making gains at China’s expense and was also competing strongly with Russia in Northeast Asia. Following its successes in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895 and Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, Japan acquired Taiwan and brought Manchuria predominantly under her influence. In the 1930s and early 1940s the main territorial threat to China was from Japan. In 1931 Japanese forces seized Manchuria and then war broke out between Japan and China in 1937, first in the north, extending subsequently to large eastern parts of China. From 1941 this conflict became the China theatre of the Pacific War. As compared with Northeast Asia, in Southeast Asia there was a stronger emphasis on territorial expansion by the Western powers. Japan did not become involved in this territorial expansion until the Pacific War. As previously indicated, up until the early nineteenth century the Western powers in Southeast Asia had established some centers and limited areas where they had political control. During the course of the nineteenth century there was greater competition among those powers, which encouraged the acquisition of colonies in certain regions. The main changes in Southeast Asia involved Britain, France and Netherlands. Britain was the colonial power in Burma (Myanmar), Singapore, Malay Peninsula and northern Borneo. France acquired Indochina i.e Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. Netherlands expanded its control in the entire archipelago of Indonesian. In addition to these European powers, United States became a colonial power when it got hold of the Philippines from Spain after the latter’s defeat in the Spanish-American War (1898-1899). In the Southeast Asia, Thailand was the only country, escaped colonial rule due to the country’s location as a buffer zone between the British and French spheres in mainland Southeast Asia. During the early twentieth century, nationalist movements developed as a challenge to Western rule in a number of Southeast Asian countries. The most significant movements were witnessed in Indonesia and Vietnam but the Japanese expansion into the region during the Pacific War posed the greatest challenge to the existing colonial system. Japan occupied all of the British, Dutch, and US possessions in Southeast Asia. In Indochina Japan had the cooperation of the Vichy French government, Thailand Indonesia and Burma cooperated and worked with Japan as a means of advancing own goals. With Japan’s defeat in 1945, clearly the re-imposition of the previous colonial system would be no easy task.

Cold War Era (1945-1989)

9. During the post Cold War era, the international relations in Asia Pacific included the new international roles of China, Japan and the United States. The significant developments during the era were the Cold War conflicts in the 1950s and 1960s, Southeast Asia’s decolonization, Sino-Soviet conflict, Sino-American rapprochement, the emergence of Southeast Asian regionalism and postcolonial conflicts in Southeast Asia. To appreciate the significance of these events and their interrelationships it will be helpful to focus on these issues in a chronological sequence:

a. The late 1940s laid the foundations for international relations in Asia Pacific for the entire post war period.

b. The US occupied defeated Japan from 1945 to 1951, intended on democratizing and demilitarizing Japan so as to ensure that Japan would never again become a threat.

c. By 1947, the United States had shifted tack due to changes occurring at a global level.

d. The beginning of Cold War shifted US focus towards containment of communism, specifically of the Soviet Union

e. In 1951, the United States concluded a lenient peace treaty with Japan to make her an ally in that struggle.

f. After the mutual security treaty, Japan joined the emerging US alliance system. The developments in Japan were consistent with US Cold War objectives; however, developments in China were more of a setback.

CHAPTER II

Factors Influencing Policies in the Region

1. During World War II, the United States had expected China to play a major role as a replacement for Japan in East Asia, which also provided the basis for China to become permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. However, with the defeat of Japan, full-scale civil war resumed between the communists and nationalists in China. Despite United States support to the nationalists, who had already been weakened by the war with Japan, the communists extended their political support in many areas and by late 1949 controlled the whole of the mainland. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was proclaimed on 1 October 1949; undoubtedly this development and subsequent Sino-Soviet alliance created in 1950, had major implications for the international dynamic in Asia Pacific. The United States construed the emergence of the PRC as a fillip for the Soviet Union. The Chinese revolution had received little support from Stalin, who maintained diplomatic relations with the nationalist government until 1949, the Sino-Soviet tensions remained hidden till there was an open conflict by the 1960s.

2. In the beginning of Cold War era the Southeast Asia confronted with issues related to the decolonization as under:

a. With the defeat of Japan, the two colonial powers most intent on restoring their pre war positions were France and the Netherlands. In both cases conflict ensued with the relevant nationalist movements.

b. In Vietnam, war between France and the communist-led Viet Minh (1946 to 1954). The Viet Minh’s communist orientation made it suspect in the eyes of the United States.

c. US perceived the success of the Viet Minh would bolster the position of China and the USSR in the region.

d. In Indonesia the conflict was a contest between colonialism and nationalism, and by 1949 the Netherlands had conceded independence.

e. In 1946, Philippines got independence from the United States.

f. Britain granted independence to Burma (Myanmar) in 1948.

3. During the 1950s and 1960s, Japan gradually emerged once again as a major economic power in Asia Pacific. It relied on the United States for defence. There were significant US forces in Japan, and Okinawa remained under US control until 1972. Japan gave low-level support to the United States during the Korean, and Vietnam Wars. There was a mismatch between Japan’s growing economic strength and its very limited international political role. In Southeast Asia issues of decolonization continued and from the Vietnamese communist perspective the Vietnam War was simply a continuation of the earlier struggle against the French for independence. Malaya got independence from Britain in 1957, latter in 1963, Singapore and the northern Borneo territories joined in the new federation of Malaysia. This development provoked a conflict and Sukarno, Indonesia’s first president, saw the new federation as a neo-colonial scheme to perpetuate British influence, he mounted an anti-Malaysia campaign known as “Konfrontasi” (Confrontation) which ended after the coup in September 1965 by Indonesian military, which emerged under new President Suharto was strongly anticommunist and hundreds of thousands of alleged communists and their sympathizers were massacred. These changes in Indonesia brought an end to Confrontation and prepared the way for a new regionalism when the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in 1967. Apart from Indonesia, the founding members were Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. This also strengthened the relations among the non-communist countries in Southeast Asia as well.

Confrontation Between US and China

4. In the 1950s and 1960s international relations in Asia Pacific also witnessed direct confrontation between United States and China in the context of the Korean War (1950-1953), which commenced with communist North Korea’s attack on anticommunist South Korea on 25 June 1950. With UN authorization, US forces with the support from other countries, had come for the assistance of South Korea. However, instead of stopping at the dividing line between the two Koreas, the United States took the conflict into the north. China felt threatened, and entered the war. Moreover, sending of the US Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait meant that Chinese communist forces could not liberate Taiwan from the nationalists. The PRC saw US protection of Taiwan as unwarranted interference in the Chinese civil war. From the Chinese perspective the United States was attempting “encirclement” of China. The PRC became the main focus of the US containment strategy in Asia Pacific

5. In the 1960s, the emergence of the Vietnam War also highlighted the Sino-US confrontation. The United States interpreted the conflict between Vietnamese communist forces and the anticommunist Saigon government from the perspective of its global strategy of containment. Both the USSR and China were seen as supporting the Vietnamese communists. It was believed that the defeat of South Vietnam would mean an extension of Chinese power. There was an important element of “power politics” in this conflict and each country competed for influence in different regions of the world. In Vietnam, for example, China and the USSR did not engage in a cooperative endeavour, but instead vied for dominant influence. The fact that both powers espoused communism added an important ideological dimension to the conflict.

Sino-US rapprochement

6. During the 1970s and 1980s the most significant development in international relations was the emergence of the Sino-US rapprochement. The Nixon administration sought to achieve improved relations with both the communist powers i.e China and the USSR, thereby improving US leverage. China considered its conflict with the USSR, more threatening than its conflict with the United States. Improved US relations would enable China to focus its efforts on its issues with the USSR. This convergence in interests paved the way for a visit to China by President Richard Nixon in 1972. In the Shanghai Communiqué, as signed by the two sides, the United States recognized the “one China” principle, also maintained its interest in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. The US and the PRC establish formal diplomatic relations in 1979, US recognition of the Republic of China (Taiwan) ceased and the mutual security treaty also ended. Taiwan became more isolated, although the United States continued arms sales through the Taiwan Relations Act (1979). Apart from the changes in the US-China-Taiwan relationship, the effect of the Sino-US rapprochement also ended polarization in the region and allowed for greater fluidity in international relationships. There was added scope for regional countries to develop relations with both China and the United States and to pursue more independent policies. From the US perspective the Sino-US rapprochement made withdrawal from the Vietnam conflict easier. It would have been much more difficult for the United States if it were presented as a boost for the major communist powers, and China in particular. In 1975 the Saigon government felled and Vietnam as a whole now came under communist rule, communist governments also emerged in Cambodia and Laos. The Khmer Rouge government in Cambodia was also strongly anti-Vietnamese. In 1978, Vietnam intervened and deposed the Khmer Rouge government. China supported the anti-Vietnamese resistance while the USSR backed Vietnam. The ASEAN countries and the United States also supported the opposition to Vietnam.

7. The greater fluidity in international relations in Asia Pacific following the Sino-US rapprochement had implications for Japan. The United States encouraged Japan to expand its international role but Japan remained cautious. Neighboring countries, particularly China and South Korea, were suspicious of any moves by Japan to expand its security role. Japan was active in the Group of 7 ( world’s major economic powers, known as G7) and expanded its links with Southeast Asia. However, Japanese strength could also lead to resentment in many countries. Japanese economic development provided a model for certain other East Asian countries to follow.

8. The end of the Cold War once again witnessed US main contest in Asia Pacific with China, although relationship had now been transformed with the achievement of rapprochement in 1972. In Asia Pacific the major developments relating to the end of the Cold War concerned the Soviet Union. Soviet-Japanese relations did not change significantly. Soviet-US relations clearly changed at the global level but there were also implications in the North Pacific. Tensions relating to the opposing military deployments of the United States and the USSR in this region did ease at this time. While understanding the historical background helps to put recent developments in the international politics of Asia Pacific into context, it is constructive now to be aware of some of the key features of the polities of the region.

CHAPTER III

Regional Political and Economic System

Political Systems

1. Asia Pacific encompasses a broad range of political systems. First of all in relation to the major powers, both the United States and Japan have liberal democratic political systems; China has an authoritarian political system under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Western powers such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have liberal democratic principles. A number of the states in both Northeast and Southeast Asia are based on democratic principles. In Northeast Asia, South Korea and Taiwan have democratization since late 1980s. The Russian Federation (in the Russian Far East) has moved toward democratization since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but also retains some authoritarian features. In Southeast Asia the Philippines since independence, has followed a democratic model, except martial law under President Ferdinand Marcos (1972-1981). In Malaysia and Singapore, it is a democratic political system although in Malaysia the Malay-dominated Barisan Nasional has ruled since independence and under the People’s Action Party, Singapore has been essentially a one-party state. Following Suharto’s fall in May 1998, Indonesia too has moved in the direction of democratization. Thailand, another Southeast Asian state dominated by the military, has been engaged in democratization since the early 1990s. Cambodia under “strong man” Hun Sen is democratic in form but also employs authoritarian practices. East Timor achieved independence in 2002 on the basis of democratic institutions. Apart from China, there are communist-oriented authoritarian governments in North Korea, Vietnam, and Laos. While there have been moves toward reform in Vietnam, Myanmar is the main instance of a military-dominated regime in the region, and Brunei is ruled by a sultanate.

Economic Systems

2. In terms of economic systems, most Asia Pacific countries are broadly capitalist. Even within a predominantly capitalist economy, government enterprises can play a key role in some situations. The two major economic powers of Asia Pacific are the United States and Japan; the United States has the world’s largest GDP, Japan has the second largest. Both countries have advanced industrial economies, and the United States is also a major agricultural producer. China is an emerging economic power, with a significant private sector. The Japanese version of capitalism is much more controlled than the US version. In Northeast Asia South Korea and Taiwan, two of the “newly industrializing countries” (NICs), are close to the Japanese model. Australia and Canada are closer to the United States in approach; both countries are also leading agricultural producers. New Zealand is a smaller version yet.

3. In Southeast Asia, Singapore has the most advanced economy. Prior to the Asian economic crisis of 1997, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia experienced significant economic growth through the development of their manufacturing sectors. All three were adversely affected by the economic crisis, with Indonesia most so. The newer members of ASEAN i.e Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia and also newly independent East Timor have essentially Third World economies. Brunei is a small oil-rich state. Vietnam and Laos have communist-style centralized economies, but with reforms enabling the private sector to play an increasingly important role. In Southeast Asia, North Korea has experienced significant economic decline.

US Economic Interest in the Region

4. US is also pursuing an aggressive economic and trade agenda in Asia to demonstrate economic leadership in the region and shape the agenda for future years to accelerate regional economic integration. US is taking a three-pronged approach to driving successful engagement with the region: securing ratification of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, achieving milestone progress on the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations and making the APEC more effective. Presently, the 21 APEC economies, with approximately 2.7 billion consumers, purchase almost 60 percent of U.S. goods exports. Seven of the United States’ top fifteen trading partners are in APEC. Strong Asian participation in APEC, the WTO, and the G-20 reflects the increasing importance of Asian economies and their centrality to strengthening the multilateral trading system and sustaining US economic recovery. The continued integration of the U.S with APEC economies, which will benefit workers, consumers, and businesses in the region and create jobs in the United States. The region is essential to the success of President Obama’s National Export Initiative, and his goal of doubling U.S. exports by 2015. In strategic terms, it will underscore our commitment to prosperity and security in the Asia Pacific and fortify our leadership role and influence in the region.

5. Another important pathway to expanding U.S. economic engagement in Asia, and increasing U.S. exports to dynamic Asian markets, is the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, or TPP. The nine APEC economies involved Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States, represent almost 40 percent of APEC’s total goods and services exports. With these economies US is negotiating a new template for a high-quality, high ambition, 21st century trade agreement. This is a strategic agreement that is central to enhancing the 21st century supply chain and new economies.

CHAPTER IV

U.S. Strategic Framework and General Approach in the Asia Pacific

1. Recent trends appear to indicate that the Asia-Pacific will become the centre of attention in the 21st century. Whether the 21st century remains ”American” or becomes ”Pacific” is a matter of debate, but one can still argue in defence of the broader ”Asia-Pacific century.” The security role of the United States and the ascent of China to superpower status are likely to be a central focus of the world. The regional security is not by simply looking at what states do in Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, or East Asia as a whole but it also depends on the activities of great powers inside and outside East Asia, and relations among powerful states, especially China, Japan, Russia, and the United States; these states are also directly involved as members of a regional security regime, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). One may argue that the United States is not an East Asian state because it is external to the region, but at the same it is believed that US involvement in the security calculus is must for the region as many of the East Asian states trust the United States more than they trust each other.

2. It is now becoming evident that America considers success in the 21st century is linked to its success of policy in Asia-Pacific region. As Secretary Clinton has said, “much of the history of the 21st century will be written in Asia”. It is understood that the region’s influence is growing immensely and Asian nations are vital contributors of the global economy and their opinions and decisions have profound influence on addressing complex and emerging transnational challenges. Despite tremendous growth in the Asia-Pacific, the region still faces some of the most daunting challenges of the 21st century. North Korea and Myanmar remain alien to the region’s prosperity and continue to be considered the main cause for insecurity and instability. The most critical issues, which the world is facing today are the nuclear proliferation, unresolved territorial disputes, military competition, violent extremism, financial crises and ineffective governments. The growing demand over energy and natural resources also poses major risk in the region and demands collective action. Due to rapid emergence of transnational security risks and threats viz aviz US long-term national interests in the region. It is now becoming imperative for US to focuss her attention and work with her allies and partners in the region to address and meet these significant challenges. To remains true to its identity as a Pacific power and following a long history and commitment to Asia, The US Administration has articulated a five-part framework for engagement in the Asia Pacific:

a. Modernize and deepen alliances with Japan, Australia the Republic of Korea, Philippines and Thailand.

b. Broaden engagement with important countries like Singapore Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Mongolia, New Zealand and most notably India.

c. With China, develop stable, comprehensive and predictable relationship.

d. Engage and invest in the region’s promising multilateral architecture.

e. Pursue trade and economic strategy more aggressively.

3. United State is working to support the region’s own efforts to promote democratic principles, freedom of religion and expression and protect human rights,. US is also advocating and trying hard for the restoration of democracies in countries like Fiji, Myanmar. Voicing to promote rule of law, good governance, and respect for human rights especially in China and Vietnam. The swiftness of US engagement in this getting more and more important region indicates the renewed emphasis on consolidating, developing and deepening partnerships, as US Secretary Clinton has articulated, “our forward-deployed diplomacy in Asia seeks to leverage these relationships to underwrite regional security, heighten prosperity, and support stronger democratic institutions and the spread of universal human rights in the Asia-Pacific region”.

4. In number of areas, the region offers the United States tremendous opportunities, including forming new strategic partnerships and expanding markets for economic interests. Apart from new alliances, US reliance on Japan would remain a cornerstone of strategic engagement in Asia. In Northeast Asia, the other critical ally is the Republic of Korea (ROK), for whom the US remains committed to the defence and to an enduring military presence there. US alliances with the South Korea and Japan play an exceptionally important role in ensuring peace and stability in Northeast Asia, especially to counter the provocative and destabilizing policies of North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK). During an important U.S, Japan and South Korea Ministerial meeting in December 2010, it was declared that the belligerent actions of North Korea, threatening all three countries will be met jointly.

5. US also consider Australia, the largest non-NATO contributor to the coalition effort in Afghanistan as well, a strategic anchor for regional stability and playing an incredibly important role in maintaining global security. U.S and Australian forces extending a legacy of cooperation since long, the manifestation of same is the recent launch of the Australia-United States ‘Force Posture Review Working Group’, to explore the potential for expanded U.S.-Australia military cooperation in order to optimize U.S. force posture in the Asia-Pacific region. With the other regional countries the US is focussing more for strengthening alliances, as under:

a. Philippines and Thailand US is working closely with the Philippines and Thailand to improve their maritime security and disaster response capabilities, enhancing mutually beneficial military relationships through joint exercises, information sharing, logistics assistance, and capacity-building measures.

b. India US government has taken significant steps to enhance engagement with India, which will be playing a key role in the Asia-Pacific. As a growing international player, US consider, India as a counter weight to China and engaging her on a wide array of regional issues.

c. Indonesia US engagement with Indonesia was manifested during US President’s historic trip to Jakarta in 2012.. The launch of the Comprehensive Partnership by both countries on bilateral, regional and global issues will further boost growing corporation.

d. Malaysia: The relations between the two countries had never been so warmth and cordial in the past. However, since 2009 after taking over as Prime Minister Mr Najib has taken number of steps in bringing the two countries closer. Malaysia-US are participating in various military exercises and unprecedented number of US ships including carrier groups are also frequently visiting Malaysian ports. The personnel of medical team from the Malaysian Armed Forces are currently deployed in Bamyan province, Afghanistan on US request. Both countries are also working jointly in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations.

e. Mongolia Mongolia, despite an ancient country yet a relatively young democracy on the verge of an economic boom may offers some opportunities for US companies. Mongolia cooperates closely with US, hosting and conducting training for peacekeeping operations and has provided 200 troops, deployed in Afghanistan as International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

f. Vietnam: US over last several years has broadened and deepened engagement with Vietnam on trade, security, non proliferation, etc. Vietnam is also among our eight negotiating partners in the TPP talks. Both countries agreed and moving toward a strategic partnership.

g. New Zealand The recent visit of Secretary Clinton to New Zealand helped in defrosting the diplomatic relations after a pause of 25-year since mid 1980s. Both countries signed the Wellington Declaration which will establish a framework for a new United States-New Zealand strategic partnership.

h. Singapore: US and Singapore are already strong partner on non-proliferation and other regional security matters. US is also taking steps to further enhance bilateral engagement with Singapore. In addition, Singapore is participated in global security operations with US e.g in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Gulf of Aden counter-piracy efforts.

CHAPTER V

An Overview of China’s Policy in Asia Pacific

1. An important component of US efforts in the Asia Pacific is an approach to China. Through this approach, US is pursuing a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China. As Secretary Clinton has said, “the U.S.-China relationship is at a critical juncture; how we manage the relationship today with its elements of both competition and cooperation will have a large impact on the future of the region”. Over the past couple of years, US and China have taken some measure to move the relationship in a positive direction with solid and tangible steps to translate these words into action through diplomacy. Nuclear Security Summit held in Seol was attended by Chinese President; there he also met US President. In another move, China voted in favour of strengthening sanctions on Iran at the UN Security Council. The success of US-China approach was more clearly visible during state visit to Washington by President Hu’s in January 2011, when for the first time China acknowledged the real concern of the world about the DPRK’s uranium enrichment program. President Hu’s visit was a success in many ways as it was materialised after concerted effort by both sides and would surely help to get this relationship right in a manner that interests of both countries are well protected. Other major developments in this regard are as under:

a. Towards Taiwan, United Stated approach to continue to be guided by their One China policy based on the three joint communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act. In the period ahead, US would seek to encourage for more dialogue between the two countries, as well as emphasising on reduced military tensions.

b. In the South China Sea, US is to continue to believe on the freedom of navigation. Recent actions by Chinese government including crackdowns on foreign and Chinese journalists, US has shown concerns about human rights violations.

c. US would continue to push China for further action on North Korea for violation of UN Security Council Resolutions. With regards to Iran, US may press China for more tightly enforced sanctions.

d. On the economic front, US will continue for lowering trade barriers by China. US government will continue to press China for visible progress on economic issues, which includes further progress on trade and investment and full implementation of commitments it made during Chinese President visit to US.

South China Sea-Dispute

2. Southeast Asian states are of great strategic importance as they stretch across the Indian and Pacific Oceans where the world’s most crucial trading and energy supply routes pass including the vulnerable and congested Strait of Malacca.

Many of the countries harbour some sense of enmity toward China due to the escalating territorial rows in the energy-rich South China Sea. Many including the Philippines and Vietnam have sought America’s help in backing them over the escalating spats. From Washington’s perspective, China’s aggressive behaviour in the maritime disputes could disrupt the regional “rule-based” order, which the U.S. has fostered since the end of World War II. Striving to use the 10-member Association of South East Asian Nations as a crucial tool to maintain regional stability and security, the U.S. has stressed the freedom of navigation and argued that the maritime disputes be resolved peacefully, not coercively, with an oblique reference to China. In recent years, China has taken an aggressive stance over its maritime disputes with Japan, Philippines, Vietnam and others. “Due to the possibility that China could undermine the ‘global commons’ such as the freedom of navigation and commerce with its anti-access strategy, the U.S. is rebalancing its military and diplomatic resources toward this region, following a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

3. The disputes in South China Sea have been flared up more pronounced recently. In May 2011, for instance, the Vietnamese reported that Chinese warships harassing oil-exploration vessels in the South China Sea. In two instances, Vietnamese authorities claimed, cables attached to underwater survey equipment were purposely slashed. In April 2012, armed Chinese marine surveillance ships blocked efforts by Filipino vessels to inspect Chinese boats suspected of illegally fishing off Scarborough Shoal, an islet in the South China Sea claimed by both countries. The East China Sea Japanese authorities arrested 14 Chinese citizens who had attempted to land on one of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands to press their country’s claims, provoking widespread anti-Japanese protests across China and a series of naval show-of-force operations by both sides in the disputed waters. Regional diplomacy, for settling disputes in a peaceful manner, has been under growing strain due to these maritime disputes having military encounters. In July 2012, at the annual meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asian leaders were unable to agree on a final communiqué, for the first time in the organization’s 46-year history. When final document was thwarted when Cambodia,

a close ally of China’s, refused to endorse compromise language on a proposed “code of conduct” for resolving disputes in the South China Sea. Two months later, when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Beijing in an attempt to promote negotiations on the disputes, officials there refused to cede any ground at all.

4. Recently China has announced a new policy for 2013 in that Chinese warships would now be empowered to stop, search, or simply repel foreign ships that entered the claimed waters. This move coincided with an increase in the size and frequency of Chinese naval deployments in the disputed areas. In December 2012, the Japanese military scrambled F-15 fighter jets when a Chinese marine surveillance plane flew into airspace near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Another worrisome incident occurred on January 2013, when four Chinese surveillance ships entered Japanese-controlled waters around those islands for 13 hours. Two days later, Japanese fighter jets were again scrambled when a Chinese surveillance plane returned to the islands. Chinese fighters then came in pursuit, the first time supersonic jets from both sides flew over the disputed area. The Chinese clearly have little intention of backing down, having indicated that they will increase their air and naval deployments in the area, just as the Japanese are doing. Several factors seem to be conspiring to heighten the risk of confrontation, including leadership changes in China and Japan, and a geopolitical reassessment by the United States. In China, a new leadership team is placing renewed emphasis on military strength and on what might be called national assertiveness. Xi Jinping has made several heavily publicized visits to assorted Chinese military units, all clearly intended to demonstrate to boost the capabilities and prestige of the country’s army, navy, and air force. He has already linked this drive to his belief that his country should play a more vigorous and assertive role in the region and the world.

5. During his speech to soldiers, a Chinese surveillance plane entered disputed air space over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea, prompting Japan to scramble those F-15 fighter jets. In Japan, too, a new leadership team is placing renewed emphasis on military strength and national assertiveness, to bolster the Japanese military and assume a tougher stance on the East China Sea dispute. In his first few weeks in office, Japan Prime Minister Abe has already announced plans to increase military spending. Equally worrisome, Abe promptly negotiated an agreement with the Philippines for greater cooperation on enhanced “maritime security” in the western Pacific, a move intended to counter growing Chinese assertiveness in the region. Inevitably, this will spark a harsh Chinese response and because the United States has mutual defence treaties with both countries, it will also increase the risk of U.S. involvement in future engagements at sea. The China and Japan tension over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is boiling up to an alarming level. The recent visit to Southeast Asia by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe underscores the seriousness of the issue and instead of visiting Washington; his first overseas trip after taking over was to Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia and even before his visit, the foreign minister visited Philippines, Singapore and Brunei.

In tune with the U.S. policy, Japan has also agreed to step up bilateral missile defence cooperation. The allies also finalized the deal to relocate some 9,000 U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam and other locations, so as to enhance the marines’ strategic flexibility and reduce the geographical vulnerability stemming from their being concentrated on the Japanese island.

Concepts against anti-access strategy

6. The U.S. is stepping up its strategic engagement in the Asia-Pacific as an increasingly assertive China poses a challenge to the regional order and unnerves its allies and partners relying on its security assistance. Washington has been strengthening regional defence alliances, its military presence and multilateral institutions on security and economic matters to contain China, as US and her allies consider that capitalizing on its economic wealth, China has steadfastly upgraded its military capability including its increasingly sophisticated missile technology. Particularly, it has focused on enhancing “asymmetric” capabilities for air, sea and land operations that can offset America’s military superiority. The by product of the capabilities is what the U.S. calls the “anti-access/area-denial” strategy designed to prevent any adversary from entering its military operational area or restrict the enemy’s freedom of action within the area. For China, securing an unimpeded, stable supply of energy and resources is of paramount importance to continue economic growth and thus strengthen public support for the political leadership. It has sought to develop safer, shorter and more cost-effective maritime and overland trade routes by strengthening relations with Indian Ocean states including Pakistan and Myanmar through economic assistance and other support programs. The West has eyed the moves with suspicion, arguing that its creation of the so-called “string of pearls” would be a prelude to building a series of naval bases that could undermine the freedom of navigation and challenge the U.S. for regional preponderance. China apparently feels vexed and boxed with its geostrategic ally vital neighbours including Myanmar being courted by the U.S. Its state media have denounced Washington’s policy for disturbing Beijing’s ties with neighbouring states and posing direct or indirect security challenges. Washington has repeated that its policy is not aimed at hemming in China.

CHAPTER VI

US Strategic Interest in Asia Pacific

1. It is becoming more evident from US shift in policy towards Asia Pacific that the rebalance is now top priority for the Pentagon, the same was also clear from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s exhausting schedule of diplomatic visits, to all ten ASEAN member states, including Timor-Leste during 2011 and late 2012. In July 2012, Clinton was in Cambodia to participate in the ASEAN Regional Forum (a foreign ministers’ meeting for ASEAN members and dialogue partners) for the fourth consecutive time. In November, President Barack Obama made his first foreign trip (first ever by any serving US president) following his re-election, to Myanmar with a view to encouraging further political and economic reforms. He also visited Thailand and Cambodia, which held the ASEAN chair, underscored US willingness to support ASEAN’s centrality in Asian regional multilateralism. It came at a time when China’s strategy became evident at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July, and again at the ASEAN Summit in November, had seemed and viewed especially by US, to be aimed at disrupting ASEAN unity, with regards to the South China Sea. Obama participated in the East Asian Summit, the first time the US had done so and co-chaired a US-ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting, which agreed to institutionalise itself on an annual basis ‘as a further step towards raising the US-ASEAN partnership to a strategic level’, in the words of the White House. From the US perspective at least, there is an important economic imperative for this incipient strategic partnership and at the same time, expanding economic ties could work in favour of Washington’s broader influence in a sub-region that has seemed increasingly in thrall to the rapidly expanding economic power of China. The US is also aiming and preparing ASEAN countries for joining ‘high-standard trade agreements’, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

2. A shift in of US policy towards Asia during 2012 is strengthening of America’s military deployments, enhanced political relationships and economic partnerships in the region. It is evident that China’s growing power and assertiveness have provided an important stimulus for renewed US policy activism in a sub-region towards which some observers had detected neglect by Washington over the previous decade. But while Southeast Asian states may take advantage of renewed American interest to hedge against China’s rise, most of them will keep their strategic options open. Against the backdrop of severe financial constraints, the impending withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan and substantial reductions in American troops in Europe, the Pentagon’s Defence Strategic Guidance document in January 2012 talked of ‘pivoting’ US national security efforts towards Asia, seen as the increasingly important locus of US strategic and economic interests. However, within months, US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta when he spoke at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June was avoiding this terminology, which did not highlight the strong sense of long-term commitment that Washington wished to convey. Instead, they spoke of a ‘rebalance’ to the Asia-Pacific. According to Panetta, “as part of this rebalancing effort we are strengthening our presence in Southeast Asia and in the Indian Ocean region”. To ensure its commitment in the Asia pacific, US is further enhancing her presence, as under:

a. In addition to placing 2500 US marines and supporting aviation units in Australia, the US has deepened its strategic cooperation with Thailand, capability enhancements of the Philippines, to improve its ‘maritime presence’; deploying littoral combat ships (LCS) to Singapore.

b. US has also enhanced security partnerships with India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Vietnam.

3. A new emphasis on Southeast Asia as a regional focus in US foreign and security policy has provided a broader setting for these military developments. In his June speech, Panetta also talked about Washington’s strong support for Asia’s ‘deepening regional security architecture’, including his own involvement in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus, which involved the ten ASEAN defence ministers and those of eight key dialogue partners. On the South China Sea, where tensions have escalated between territorial claimants that are members of ASEAN (notably the Philippines and Vietnam) and China since 2009, Panetta emphasised US support for efforts ‘to develop a binding code of conduct that would create a rules-based framework for regulating the conduct of parties’.

US rebalance or Containment of China?

4. The Obama administration has consistently denied that US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific is not for containing China or US rivalry with China has motivated the Shift in US policy rather it is to maintain equable relations with Beijing and to reassure ASEAN member states concerned that the strong military and security element of America’s new interest in Southeast Asia does not indicate the beginnings of a new Cold War, which might ultimately force them for subsequent alliances. Despite US assurances, it is widely understood that the US rebalance is a reaction to China’s growing power, confidence and assertiveness in a part of the world that it assesses to be strategically important. Indeed, most Southeast Asian states are benefited from China’s economic expansion, particularly after the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area agreement in 2010. However, geopolitical implications of China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, is raising concern to Southeast Asian and rebalance is seen more positively. Nevertheless, the reaction of Southeast Asian states to the US proactive policy towards them has by no means been uniformly enthusiastic. ASEAN’s members are diverse in terms of their history, political systems and international outlook and there had always been different views regarding America’s regional role in the region. However, countries like Philippines are getting nervous due lack of an external defence capability as maritime tensions with China has escalated, particularly after a naval stand-off began over the disputed Scarborough Shoal in April 2012, Manila has agreed with the US to reinforce substantially their bilateral defence relations, which had languished after the closure of major military bases in the country in 1992. As a result, US navy ships making additional port calls even at the former Subic Bay, conducting more joint exercises, established a National Coast Watch Centre and has also supplied additional military equipment, intended to enhance the Philippines’ awareness of threats to its maritime interests. Although Philippines government is supporting the US rebalance due her own pressing security requirements, both are bound by their bilateral Mutual Defence Treaty dating from 1952, but it is unclear whether the treaty applies in the event of conflict that Manila claims in the South China Sea and how the US would respond to an escalating crisis between China and the Philippines. If the treaty would indeed apply, this might embolden the Philippines and thereby risk entangling America in a dispute of no strategic importance to itself. It is widely perceived that treaty would not apply, while the US will be more interested in securing greater access to Philippine airfields on a longer-term basis, which off course will have reluctance in Manila to accede to any such arrangements.

US-China Military/Economic Alliance with Regional Key Actors

5. Thailand In early 2012, Thailand hosted reputedly now the world’s largest multinational military exercise, involving 9,000 US personnel, 3,600 from Thailand. Other countries including Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea also participated. But despite US efforts to intensify security relations with Bangkok due Bangkok’s concerns over Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, Thai foreign policy has continued to follow its traditional course of ‘bending with the wind’. In April 2012, the Prime Ministers of Thailand and China agreed a series of deals, which elevated their bilateral relations to a ‘strategic partnership’ three months before Thailand assumed the role of ASEAN’s coordinator of relations with Beijing. The intensifying relations with China include a defence dimension as well. A major Thai arms-procurement project, revealed in September 2012, will use Chinese technology to develop a guided multiple rocket launch system.

6. Singapore Singapore is not a US ally, but its defence and security relations with Washington, under a Strategic Framework Agreement, are in many ways closer than those of the Philippines and Thailand. Singapore has shown willingness to US for naval deployments in Singapore and allowed four ships (LCS) may be operating by 2017. While Singapore is ready to provide facilities to the US Navy but its refusal to be drawn into an alliance underlines the reality that it might remain neutral in case of US-China conflict.

7. Vietnam Most of the regional countries have been even more cautious in their responses to the core security aspects of the US rebalance. Vietnam is a ‘front-line state’ in the South China Sea, where it dispute with China over the Spratly Islands, Paracels and other features, and even fought a major war with China in 1979. Despite bitterly fought Second Indochina War with the US, Hanoi obviously welcomes revived US interest in Southeast Asia to hold back China’s assertiveness but not at the cost of its relations with Beijing. Veitnam is still continued to strictly ration US Navy port calls in the face of intense American interest in regaining access to Cam Ranh Bay naval base, as demonstrated by Panetta’s visit to the facility in June 2012.

8. Malaysia Malaysia and Indonesia are both Muslim-majority states where Islamic fundamentalism, anti-Zionism and neutralism are central elements of political discourse. Despite their generally pro-Western inclination, governments tread carefully with respect to their relations with the US for fear of alienating important domestic constituencies. Although a claimant in the Spratly Islands, Malaysia has maintained a positive attitude towards its relations with China, its most important trading partner. In September 2012, China and Malaysia held their first bilateral ‘defence and security consultation’, agreeing to strengthen ‘mutual exchange and cooperation’ in the military sphere.

9. Indonesia Relations with the US form an important part of Indonesia’s increasingly confident international diplomacy. In November 2011, Obama and his Indonesian President reaffirmed their commitment to the bilateral ‘comprehensive partnership’ launched a year previously. However, the strategic benefits of this partnership for the US may be limited as Indonesia places great emphasis on further developing mutually beneficial relations with China. In the defence sphere, Beijing agreed that Indonesian industry even could produce the C-705 anti-ship missile under licence.

10. Myanmar In the longer term, one absorbing possibility exist that Washington might also develop security relations with a reforming Myanmar, such a development could represent an important strategic windfall for the US. However, it is likely that significant security relations could develop only if there were a major change in Myanmar’s government following the general election in 2015.

CHAPTER VIII

Conclusion

1. Under the Asia-oriented policy, the U.S. has been strengthening its treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand, and partnerships with India, Singapore, Indonesia, Myanmar and others. US Secretary State Hilary Clinton stated in November 2011, “As the war in Iraq winds down and America begins to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, the United States stands at a pivot point. In the next 10 years, we need to be smart and systematic about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and advance our values. One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment – diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise in the Asia-Pacific region”. The policy comes amid growing concerns that the U.S. financial challenges could weaken its security commitment in the region. Japan is the strongest supporter in the region of America’s rebalancing while it striving to adapt to the region’s changing security landscape. “The U.S. wants Japan to play a constructive role as a regional security provider. But it could not play the role under constraints such as the pacifist constitution and domestic anti-war sentiment,” said Nam of Inha University. “But Washington apparently cautions against Japan’s rightward shift. It appears to feel somewhat concerned about Shinzo Abe, the new Prime Minister who is too conservative, as it should also have to think about South Korea-Japan relations.” While Obama never quite said that his approach was intended to constrain the rise of China, few observers doubt that a policy of “containment” has returned to the Pacific. Indeed, the U.S. military has taken the first steps in this direction, announcing, for example, that by 2017 all three U.S. stealth planes, the F-22, F-35, and B-2, would be deployed to bases relatively near China and that by 2020 60% of U.S. naval forces will be stationed in the Pacific (compared to 50% today). However, the nation’s budget woes have led many analysts to question whether the Pentagon is actually capable of fully implementing the military part of any Asian pivot strategy in a meaningful way. This, in turn, has fuelled a drive by military hawks to press the administration to spend more on Pacific oriented forces and to play a more vigorous role in countering China’s “bullying” behaviour in the East and South China Seas. America’s Asian allies are waiting to see whether America will live up to its uncomfortable but necessary role as the true guarantor of stability in East Asia, or whether the region will again be dominated by belligerence and intimidation,” former Secretary of the Navy and former Senator James Webb wrote in the Wall Street Journal. Although the administration has responded to such taunts by reaffirming its pledge to bolster its forces in the Pacific, this has failed to halt the calls for an even tougher posture by Washington.

2. The Japanese-China row is raising the tensions, any close encounter in which, shots are unexpectedly fired with loss of lives, ship or plane went down could be catastrophic for the region. The Japanese press has reported that government may authorize fighter pilots to fire warning shots if Chinese aircraft penetrate the airspace over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. In response Chinese general has said that such an act would count as the start of “actual combat.” Can such a crisis be averted? Yes, if the leaders of China, Japan, and the United States, the key countries involved, take steps to defuse the belligerent and ultra-nationalistic pronouncements now holding sway and begin talking with one another about practical steps to resolve the disputes before it is beyond control and the world will look with sadness and horror on the failure of everyone involved.

3. This US rebalancing efforts to contain China’s growing assertiveness in Asia pacific is getting serious attention of all around the globe. It is generally perceived that the presence of US foot hole, in Afghanistan is to disturb China’s western trade and energy routes and now US pivot strategy in Asia Pacific is to contain China from contesting unipolarity. To assert more pressure on China, the US is strengthening China’s neighbours, Obama had an important meeting with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at ASIAN in Indonesia, and Hillary Clinton made an unexpected tour of Myanmar. Considering the fact, Myanmar is sharing very long border with China. Recently Japan is also flexing muscles towards China.

4. US also see relations with India to pursue her policy to restrict China. Due to the fact, it is absolutely necessary that India-Pakistan relations should be normalize and India pulls out her armed forces from Kashmir and shifts her focus to China. The US had already stopped Pakistan from insurgency in Kashmir so that India can be in politically stable position. Along these steps the US also strengthening India both economically and militarily, transfer of civil nuclear technology, opening American markets to India products are some examples. Furthermore the US is pushing India to emerge as a regional power from Afghanistan to the central Asia

5. The rebalancing also appears intended to target what Western analysts call China’s “string of pearls” strategy, which could help the Asian power gain a strong maritime presence