The War Measures Act History Essay

The October Crisis of 1970 and the invocation of the War Measures Act was one of the most significant events in the history of Canada. On the fifth of October, James Cross, the British Trade Commissioner, was kidnapped from his Montreal home by a group of young French Canadian terrorists, the Front de Libération du Québec or FLQ. The FLQ was a radical political group within the province of Quebec, intent on separating Quebec from Canada. Five days later, the Minister of Labour and the second in command of Quebec’s provincial government, Pierre Laporte, was kidnapped from his front lawn by a different FLQ cell. The intent of the kidnappings was to exchange Cross and Laporte for the twenty-three FLQ political prisoners responsible for the bombings, hold-ups and deaths of six innocent people, as well other drastic forms of protest.

There was tremendous support for the FLQ in Quebec, mainly by students and working class demonstrators. Many politicians, some members of the press, labour union leaders and other prominent members of society supported the FLQ, either openly or indirectly by agreeing with the views and demands of this organization. The Quebec government, lead by Premier Robert Bourassa, along with Pierre Elliot Trudeau’s Federal Government, refused negotiations with this terrorist organization. Quebec requested federal aid. On the 15th of October 1970 the Federal Army was sent into the province. The following day, both governments brought forth the implementation of the War Measures Act; an act designed for war. On the succeeding day, the body of Pierre Laporte was found strangled, bringing the crisis to its apex.

The unprecedented use of this act in a time of peace sparked enormous criticism and controversy. Both the Federal and Provincial governments argued for the justification of the act, while the opposition parties, scholars, historians, reporters and other political figures strongly criticized and argued against it. Whether the use of this act was just, or not, is a highly debatable subject. To fully assess its use, the events leading up to its employment and the effects it had on the Canadian public, as well as the opinions from both sides of the issue need to be taken into consideration.

In the fall of 1970, there were numerous converging contributors, both national and international, to the tensions and turmoil experienced in the province of Quebec. The turmoil of the health care in Quebec elevated tensions. In 1966 the Medical Care Act was passed, which allowed each province to develop and implement its own form of Federally funded health care. The government in Quebec worked on the development of the Medical Insurance Act, which would implement this healthcare. However, revisions of this act were time consuming. Each month that the act went unenforced, the province of Quebec lost out on vast amounts of federal funds. Doctors and specialists concerned with the new system went on strike at the same time as the FLQ Crisis. The two events were not directly related but this event put more pressure on the Quebec government and heightened apprehensions within the province. 2

Another contributor to the setting of the crisis was the Parti Québécois. This party’s principle political stance was the separation of Quebec from Canada. The Parti Québécois and the FLQ are often mistakenly regarded as connected organizations because of their paralleled ideologies. In actuality, the two groups were entirely distinct from one another. The FLQ perceived violence as the only conduit of achieving their demands, whereas the Parti Québécois wanted to achieve its goal through peaceful means. They objected to federal intervention in matters pertaining to Quebec. The founder and leader René Lévesque created this political party but was not an elected member of the National Assembly. Dr. Camille Laurin led the party, along with its seven members, in the National Assembly. French Canadians felt inadequately represented on a national platform.

This new, inexperienced and highly unorganized Parti Québécois led to far more chaos than benefit. Although non-violent, they were wary to object to the FLQ because they did not want to lose popularity among the student population of active protestors.3 On the 12th of October, the party added to the unrest by making the uniformed, public declaration in favor for the exchange of the political prisoners. The Parti Québécois objected to Ontario Premier John Robart’s declaration of opposition to FLQ’s separation through terrorism. This party turned the crisis into Quebec versus Ottawa, which is what exactly what the FLQ wanted.4 The Parti Québécois had a staggering influence on the attitude of the Quebec public.

The press and media were another major contributing factor to public attitudes at the time of crisis. Instead of promoting calm and order, the press raised tensions and aggression through the spreading of rumors, and through slanted reporting in favor of the Parti Québécois. The press failed to consider at the time, that the Parti Québécois declaration on the crisis may have inadvertently aided the FLQ, or that the Parti Québécois might have acted opportunistically.5

At the point of the crisis in October in 1970, the FLQ had existed for 7 years. There had been 200 bombings in Quebec and numerous other acts of violence. The government knew they were capable of violence. The press hysterically covered the events, and newspapers screamed for drastic action. The provincial government of Quebec was under enormous pressure to act.6 Public attitude reflected that many citizens of Quebec felt that the federal government of Canada was in favor of its English speaking population. This attitude added frustration among the public, and the setting of turmoil and chaos was set for the crisis that occurred in October 1970.

The separatist group Front de Libération du Québec was politically active from 1963 to 1973. Pierre Vallières and Charles Gagnon were key leads of the FLQ in October 1970. This was not one cohesive group, but rather a set of minor groups or cells, sharing a common view of the issues in Quebec. Many cells had their own agenda and goals separate from the whole of the body. “The organization, like its philosophy, depended on the views of the members at any given time. The FLQ’s cells were constantly breaking up and reforming because of police raids, arrests, and convictions in court, and also because of differences among members.”7 Prior to the 1970’s, the FLQ manifesto primarily called for separation. In 1970, at the beginning of the crisis, the demand for a workers state was added to their manifesto. Part of the manifesto was written in colloquial French or in French English slang, intentionally to distance the FLQ from the ‘intellectuals’ or bourgeoisie and align themselves with the working class.8 College and university students actively participated and demonstrated for the cause. Many sympathetically aligned with the FLQ and did not object to the acts being committed. Many helped to shelter wanted FLQ members, and many stayed silent, refraining from objection to the FLQ and its cause.

There was no official list of members. This group of like-minded individuals held varying levels of dedication. To become a member one must commit a crime for the cause. They thought their actions were giving Quebec its freedom. 1968 a long term strategy document entitled Revolutionary Strategy and the Role of the Avant-Garde outlined plans of the robberies and violence, bombings and kidnappings thought to be necessary to bring about the revolution that they sought after.9 It also outlined plans for kidnappings and assassinations. This accumulated group of revolutionary terrorists felt that violence was the only means to achieve their goals.

On the 5th of October 1970, two members of the FLQ Liberation cell kidnapped British trade commissioner James Cross, from his home, leaving a ransom note of demands. The demands included the publishing of the Front de Libération du Québec manifesto, the release of the twenty three convicted and imprisoned members of the FLQ, $500,000 in gold, the rehiring of Les Gars de Lapalme, as well as other demands. The members of the FLQ cell that kidnapped Cross were prepared and determined to achieve their demands. Members of the cell stated, “when we decided to kidnap the diplomat Cross, we weighed all the possibilities, including the sacrifice of our own lives for a cause we believed to be just. If the repressive police forces should discover us and attempt to intervene before the release of the British diplomat Cross, be sure that we will sell our lives dearly and that Mr. Cross would immediately be liquidated. We have enough dynamite in our possession to feel perfectly ‘secure’.”10

The context of the manifesto and crisis need to be taken into consideration. Turmoil, unrest and revolution were actively occurring in other parts of the world. The students of France had only a few years earlier, revolted in their own country. France had encouraged Quebec’s wish for separation.

The FLQ manifesto went through three transitions since 1963. This first manifesto called for social justice, focusing on separatism. The second version was shorter, omitting talk of violence. The third was published the day after Cross was kidnapped. This manifesto called workers to take back what was theirs: “we are the workers of Québec and we will struggle on to the bitter end. Together with all the people, we want to replace this slave society with a free society, functioning by itself and for itself; a society open to the world.”11 It was written with a shock esthetic to encourage public sympathy. The publication of the manifesto was one of the demands of the Liberation cell. Radio Canada agreed to a televised reading. The government did not condone, nor did it object to the reading. To object would heighten interest, curiosity and criticism towards the government.

To exchange convicted terrorists for hostages is an extremely difficult choice for any government. There is no ‘correct’ decision. Each situation suffers both pros and cons: to save the lives of two people by releasing convicted criminals or risk the lives of the two hostages. The FLQ directly addressed their demands to the Bourassa government who had to ultimately make the decision. “The first option meant permitting terrorist activity to replace the courts and legislature of a democratic society, where social and political reform can come about by drastic means.”12 The release of the jailed FLQ would surely invite further kidnappings. The Quebec minister of Justice, Jérôme Choquette stated that “No society can consent to have the decisions of its judicial and governmental institutional challenged or set aside by the blackmail of a minority, for that signifies the end of all social order.”13 While Choquette announced the governments refusal to release the prisoners, a separate cell, called the Chénier cell, immediately acted by kidnapping Pierre Laporte. The timing of this kidnapping made the FLQ appear to be a highly organized, incredibly swift moving group.14 They were already on their way to kidnap Laporte before the English translation of Choquette’s statement was aired.15 To the government, this swiftness frightened them and caused them to question the strength of the Front de Libération du Québec.

After the kidnapping of Laporte, Bourassa’s government met to discuss the decision. After a three-day period and much debate, the unanimous decision of non-negotiation was made. The justification behind the decision was that the FLQ demanded the release of political prisoners, but that was not what they were; they were convicted criminals. To accept the demands to release them would diminish the value of the Canadian justice system. A democratic society cannot accept blackmail as a legitimate argument in government proceedings, otherwise anarchy will replace rule of law. If the government had given in to the demands of the FLQ, this would only demonstrate the weapon that the terrorists possess, encouraging others to achieve their goals through the same means. This crisis occurred in a democratic country and the FLQ directly challenged Canadian democracy. “A democratically elected government is a trustee charged with the task of preserving the rights and freedoms of the society that chose to elect it and, accordingly, it has no mandate to cede its authority and responsibilities to terrorists.16 The government did, however, continue with attempts to negotiate with the FLQ in hopes that their stalling would allow time for authorities to find Cross and Laporte.

The FLQ was stunned by the government’s decision. The Parti Québécois publically expressed opposition to the ruling and viewed the convicted criminals as political prisoners. On October fourteenth, Lévesque and sixteen other government officials and intellectuals signed a petition calling for the exchange. They did so to show opposition to the government; they sympathized with the FLQ. The Parti Québécois failed to realize that the decision to release them would disparage the Canadian justice system.

The next aspect of the October Crisis that must be discussed is the distinction between the calling in of the Canadian Army, and the implementation of the War Measures Act. Many fail to realize that the active army presence in Quebec did not depend on the implementation of the War Measures Act. On the 15th of October 1970, under the National Defense Act, the Quebec government requested federal assistance by calling the army into the province to aid their civil powers. Opposition parties agreed with this decision. Dr. Camille Laurin initially agreed with the decision, and then reversed his opinion hours later. When asked about the insertion of the army in Quebec, Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau stated that, “we have used certain elements of the army as peace officers so that the police forces would be free to accomplish their real duties and would not be obliged to spend their time protecting your friends from another kidnapping. I believe that it is more important to rid ourselves of those who seek to impose their will on the government through a parallel power which resorts to kidnapping and extortion. “17 The army was successful, allowing the police to focus on their normal duties. Most of the population welcomed the army presence and the reassurance it brought, although, there were many who opposed.

It must be stressed that the army could be called in without the use of the War Measures Act. The two are separate from one another. The War Measures Act was developed for war. It had been invoked during World War I and II, whereby the Federal government can use all powers it deems necessary to achieve its goal. Under this act, civil liberties and judicial rights are suspended. Censorship becomes active and suspicion and distrust are at extremes. The government is easily able to arrest and detain individuals perceived as a threat, without authorization or the right to a court hearing. “The War Measures Act is based on unbridled authority, fear and the threat of violence.”18

On the 16th of October, at four a.m. the Act was invoked declaring the FLQ an illegal organization and that membership would be considered a crime. Other issues happening around the world influenced the Canadian government and Cabinet Minsters. “They believed individuals and groups of the FLQ were being financed and inspired by foreign political powers that do not share our notion of man’s fundamental liberties.”19 The fear of the unknown caused the two governments to act in such a drastic way. Trudeau may have proclaimed the War Measures Act, not because of the actual events, but rather, that he knew if the Federal government did not act decisively, their vision of Federalism would not persevere.20 The reason given for the proclamation was an apprehended insurrection, the evidence for which Canadians were to take on faith, and that Quebec had asked for the imposition of the act.21 Violence had progressively built since the formation of the FLQ and after the two kidnappings; government officials feared what would happen next. The assassination of John F. Kennedy had occurred only a few years prior. They were aware that the FLQ had a plan devised that included assassination, and they feared that it would be the next step. “Although the FLQ’s strength and resources were unknown to the police or to the governments, there was considerable evidence of a build-up, that, it was thought, could lead to even greater violence that had already occurred.”22 William Tetley, a minister of Bourassa’s cabinet believed there was sufficient reason for the government to invoke the act. Many in the cabinet quietly went along with the act, either unsure or too intimidated to speak out. Only Tommy Douglas of the New Democratic Party stood in the House each day, debating the government on its justifications for suspending civil liberties.23

Overnight twelve thousand five hundred armed troops flooded into Montreal in search of the FLQ kidnappers. Two hundred and forty two people were arrested, some in the middle of the night, and some violently. Among the arrested in Quebec, many were labour leaders, community activists and organizers and separatists of all types. These people were stripped of their rights, they could not inform their families, friends, or employers of their detainment or whereabouts. 24 Many viewed this as humiliating, and some citizens were verbally and physically abused by police.25 Homes were searched without warrants, virtually all civil rights were removed as an extreme effort to swiftly put an end to the crisis. The day after the war measures act was implemented; the strangled body of Pierre Laporte was discovered.

The reason given for the proclamation was an apprehended insurrection, the evidence for which Canadians were to take on faith.26 Paul and Jacques Rose, Bernard Lortie and Francis Simmard were the four accused of the murder of Pierre Laporte. After serving his sentence, Simmard wrote a memoire discussing his views and the views of his cell on the crisis. He proceeded to explain the reasoning for his actions and why they chose to murder Laporte.

The FLQ had never planned to kidnap Cross; they did not intend to make the issue an Anglo -French issue but rather wanted to gain political separation.27 His reasoning for partaking in the FLQ was that the issues represented by the group fully represented his situation. “We weren’t looking for an outlet for our need to revolt, it wasn’t some kind of personal assertion thing. We were trying to get a hold of our lives, our situation as worker, our poverty. For us, the words in the manifesto weren’t abstract theory. We were the manifesto.”28 The poverty of the working class was the daily lives of its members. Simmard and the Rose’s had left the country to make some money. Upon their return, they learned that an FLQ cell had acted on its own to kidnap Cross.29 They felt that the provincial and federal governments were not taking the situation seriously.30 His cell decided to kidnap a person directly responsible for the situation and Laporte was an easy target. They considered the abduction of an American diplomat, but decided to go with Laporte because he was close to their location and they knew he was at his home. They actually called his house before going to kidnap him, to see if he was home.31 Simmard’s cell waited for the governments answer regarding the demands set after the kidnapping of Cross. When Choquette rejected their demands they immediately acted.32 To them the ruling class at the conference was smug and arrogant and annoyed that the FLQ was “playing their game”33 He felt they needed to take a more drastic stance against the government to show the seriousness that the FLQ represented. “Our choices weren’t spontaneous, they weren’t individualistic. Our choices were part of the struggle for Quebec independence and social, economic and political power for the workers.”34 The decision to partake in the FLQ was a means to take control of their situation and lives.

In regards to the murder of Laporte, Simmard states that, “we never intended to kill Pierre Laporte. If we had, we wouldn’t have kidnapped him, we would have killed him. The immediate goal of the kidnapping was the release of Quebec political prisoners, the rehiring of the Lapalme workers who had been laid off and the will to get rid of a political authority that was not and would never be ours. We were sincere.”35 After the government made the decision to combat the FLQ with the War Measures Act, Simmard and his cell felt they had no choice but to kill Laporte. “We choseto kill him, it was no accident.” 36 After the death of Laporte, government support grew tremendously. Even Quebec overwhelmingly supported the War Measures Act after Laporte’s death.37The anger from the murder caused many to lose support for the FLQ. Also, most were scared after to be aligned with the FLQ under the use of the Act.

Members of the FLQ were not the only ones to criticize the government’s decision to implement the War Measures Act. Many questioned whether or not Trudeau had ulterior motives for it’s implementation. The act was used Canada wide and was exploited in parts of the country. It was intended that anyone who supported the FLQ, Canada wide would be detained. However, there were reported cases in Vancouver, Ottawa, and Regina, of police using the Act as an excuse to rid the city of any undesirables (i.e. hippies, student activists, etc.). This exploitation of the act resulted in enormous criticism towards the government. 38

Prior to the decision of the implementation of the act, it was rumored that RCMP members informed cabinet ministers that the FLQ had weapons that were threatening to the safety of the public. The government later blamed RCMP for bad information when in reality it was a lack of proper political evaluation. It was a lack of coordination between intelligence groups and the governments.39

There were major errors in the implementation of the War Measures Act. The choice of those to be arrested under the Act should have been more carefully planned and decided. They should have been allowed the right to an attorney and the public should have been more informed. However, “it was difficult…for the government to inform the public without letting the FLQ know their strategy.”40

There was also much criticism towards Trudeau directly for implementing the Measure as a means to discourage or set back the separatist movement. “The October Crisis resulted from the combined effect of the two kidnappings and the federal government’s anger at seeing the independence movement constantly gain momentum.”41

Conversely most English Canadians supported the WMA.42 In the summer of 1970, there were bombings in Montreal, FLQ calls for revolutionary action, rumors of weapon and dynamite theft, and strikes. The Bourassa government was showed that they were inadequate to lead the province in dealing with its issues. When Cross was kidnapped, Trudeau was shocked. He reacted strongly and vowed that the government would not give in to terrorists. Trudeau said “if we had agreed, as the FLQ demanded…they would have no reason to hesitate to murder, rob and bomb again…all their pals would have to do is kidnap someone else to have them released from prison- and on and on indefinitely.”43 Then Laporte was kidnapped and the stakes grew. The government in Ottawa began to fear the FLQ was more organized than initially thought. Feared that if not stopped it could lead to untold violence. 44 Bourassa and Justice Minister Jerome Choquette appeared confused as at times they seemed willing to compromise with the FLQ, then turned around and towed the harder federal line. The audacity and timing of the second kidnapping caught everyone by surprise.45 Everyone was scared and unsure of what was next to come. They believed assassinations to be next and wanted to swiftly bring an end to the crisis. Trudeau stated in regards to the mobilizations of the army into Quebec, ” Well there are a lot of bleeding hearts around who don’t like to see people with helmets and guns…All I can say is, go on and bleed, but it is more important to keep law and order in society.46 When asked how far will you go? Trudeau famously replied, “Just watch me”47

The police needed help. Instead of creating special legislation that would require a time consuming parliamentary debate and would alert terrorists of their plans, the Trudeau government decided to implement the War Measures Act despite knowing that enormous criticism that would accompany it. They thought the FLQ was a large organized group, the WMA would be justified and was the right option. If not it would only be a temporary measure. “The War Measures Act was a rough but effective way to cool the situation by taking possible agitators and FLQ sympathizers out of circulation and by assuring the populace that the governments had full control.”48

The passing of the Medical Insurance Act ended the specialist doctor’s strike on the 16th of October. The FLQ had planned demonstrations in support of the strike for that day, but with passing of both the War Measures Act and the Medical Insurance Act, the demonstrations never occurred. “The night before the War Measures Act was proclaimed, Quebec was in turmoil. The day after it was calm.”49

Twenty-four years after the October Crisis, Mitchell Sharp, who was the Deputy Prime Minister of Canada in 1970, voiced a strong opinion supporting Trudeau. “I think that Trudeau’s firm leadership, putting the preservation of Law and order above any other consideration was probably the most important single contribution he made to the preservation of peace and democracy in Canada during his time as Prime Minister…The first duty of the government is to govern – which means never giving in to chaos or terror.”50

By the end of the War Measures Act, four hundred and sixty-five people had been arrested; four hundred and three were released. Of the sixty-two not released, only thirty-two were actually charged with only eighteen convicted of minor offences.

James Cross released on the 3rd of December, by agreement with authorities, his captors were flown to Cuba. Laporte’s murderers were captured on 28th of December.

The FLQ gained support as a result of various factors. Its members seemed fully entrenched in their cause, but when Cross’ kidnappers were discovered, they did not demand for the goals of the FLQ but rather asked for exile. They were not as dedicated to the cause as they thought.51 Laporte’s kidnappers chose to be tried under the Canadian justice system, convicted, and carried out jail sentences. In Francis Simmard’s memoire he is more intent on justifying his actions rather than revealing any real remorse.

In hindsight it is easy to criticize the government ‘s for their use of the War Measures Act. They knew it was an excessive measure at the time, however, time was of the essence and they needed a means of reining control back into the hands of the government in a swift and impactful way. They did not want to allow the FLQ time to gain knowledge of governmental plans of opposition. Tensions and distrust were at an extreme, and all sought a quick end to the crisis. The War Measures Act did what it set out to do, the kidnappings ended, the crisis ended and the temporary act was then removed. “Two terrorist cells initiated a political hostage crisis. The RCMP saw the crisis as requiring good, patient, careful police work to solve. The Quebec Ministers in Ottawa deliberately chose to escalate the political magnitude of the crisis to justify emergency powers as a means of intimidating nationalists and separatists.”52 Robert Stanfield stated, “The arbitrary abrogation of individual rights weakens rather than strengthens social order.”53 Or did Canadians come together in unity by agreeing to forego individual rights and freedoms to retain the democracy of their country?

Endnotes

Bouthillier, Guy, and Edouard Cloutier. Trudeau’s Darkest Hour: War Measures in Time of Peace, October 1970. Montréal: Baraka, 2010. p.p. 161

Tetley, William. The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010. p.p. 7

Tetley, William. The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010. p.p. 9

Tetley, William. The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010. p.p. 9

Tetley, William. The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010. p.p. 12

Bouthillier, Guy, and Edouard Cloutier. Trudeau’s Darkest Hour: War Measures in Time of Peace, October 1970. Montréal: Baraka, 2010. p.p. 68

Tetley, William. The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010. p.p. 21

Tetley, William. The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010. p.p. 20

Tetley, William. The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010. p.p. 21

Tetley, William. The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010. p.p. 22

Tetley, William. The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010. p.p. 34

Tetley, William. The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010. p.p. 39

Tetley, William. The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010. p.p. 40

Bouthillier, Guy, and Edouard Cloutier. Trudeau’s Darkest Hour: War Measures in Time of Peace, October 1970. Montréal: Baraka, 2010. p.p. 68

Simard, Francis, and David Homel. Talking It Out: The October Crisis from the inside, Translated by David Homel. Montréal, Québec, Canada: Guernica, 1987. p.p 29

Tetley, William. The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010. p.p. 4

Tetley, William. The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010. p.p. 63

Bouthillier, Guy, and Edouard Cloutier. Trudeau’s Darkest Hour: War Measures in Time of Peace, October 1970. Montréal: Baraka, 2010. p.p. 15

Bouthillier, Guy, and Edouard Cloutier. Trudeau’s Darkest Hour: War Measures in Time of Peace, October 1970. Montréal: Baraka, 2010. p.p. 51

Bouthillier, Guy, and Edouard Cloutier. Trudeau’s Darkest Hour: War Measures in Time of Peace, October 1970. Montréal: Baraka, 2010. p.p. 62

Bouthillier, Guy, and Edouard Cloutier. Trudeau’s Darkest Hour: War Measures in Time of Peace, October 1970. Montréal: Baraka, 2010. p.p. 73

Tetley, William. The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010. p.p. 70

Bouthillier, Guy, and Edouard Cloutier. Trudeau’s Darkest Hour: War Measures in Time of Peace, October 1970. Montréal: Baraka, 2010. p.p. 74

Bouthillier, Guy, and Edouard Cloutier. Trudeau’s Darkest Hour: War Measures in Time of Peace, October 1970. Montréal: Baraka, 2010. p.p. 94

Bouthillier, Guy, and Edouard Cloutier. Trudeau’s Darkest Hour: War Measures in Time of Peace, October 1970. Montréal: Baraka, 2010. p.p. 94

Bouthillier, Guy, and Edouard Cloutier. Trudeau’s Darkest Hour: War Measures in Time of Peace, October 1970. Montréal: Baraka, 2010. p.p. 73

Simard, Francis, and David Homel. Talking It Out: The October Crisis from the inside, Translated by David Homel. Montréal, Québec, Canada: Guernica, 1987. p.p 13

Simard, Francis, and David Homel. Talking It Out: The October Crisis from the inside, Translated by David Homel. Montréal, Québec, Canada: Guernica, 1987. p.p 20

Simard, Francis, and David Homel. Talking It Out: The October Crisis from the inside, Translated by David Homel. Montréal, Québec, Canada: Guernica, 1987. p.p 19

Simard, Francis, and David Homel. Talking It Out: The October Crisis from the inside, Translated by David Homel. Montréal, Québec, Canada: Guernica, 1987. p.p 19

Simard, Francis, and David Homel. Talking It Out: The October Crisis from the inside, Translated by David Homel. Montréal, Québec, Canada: Guernica, 1987. p.p 20

Simard, Francis, and David Homel. Talking It Out: The October Crisis from the inside, Translated by David Homel. Montréal, Québec, Canada: Guernica, 1987. p.p 20

Simard, Francis, and David Homel. Talking It Out: The October Crisis from the inside, Translated by David Homel. Montréal, Québec, Canada: Guernica, 1987. p.p 29

Simard, Francis, and David Homel. Talking It Out: The October Crisis from the inside, Translated by David Homel. Montréal, Québec, Canada: Guernica, 1987. p.p 51

Simard, Francis, and David Homel. Talking It Out: The October Crisis from the inside, Translated by David Homel. Montréal, Québec, Canada: Guernica, 1987. p.p 169-170

Simard, Francis, and David Homel. Talking It Out: The October Crisis from the inside, Translated by David Homel. Montréal, Québec, Canada: Guernica, 1987. p.p 51

Simard, Francis, and David Homel. Talking It Out: The October Crisis from the inside, Translated by David Homel. Montréal, Québec, Canada: Guernica, 1987. p.p 86

Bouthillier, Guy, and Edouard Cloutier. Trudeau’s Darkest Hour: War Measures in Time of Peace, October 1970. Montréal: Baraka, 2010. p.p. 133

Bouthillier, Guy, and Edouard Cloutier. Trudeau’s Darkest Hour: War Measures in Time of Peace, October 1970. Montréal: Baraka, 2010. p.p. 90

Tetley, William. The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010. p.p. 101

Bouthillier, Guy, and Edouard Cloutier. Trudeau’s Darkest Hour: War Measures in Time of Peace, October 1970. Montréal: Baraka, 2010. p.p. 14

Bouthillier, Guy, and Edouard Cloutier. Trudeau’s Darkest Hour: War Measures in Time of Peace, October 1970. Montréal: Baraka, 2010. p.p. 133

English, John. Just Watch Me: The Life of Pierre Elliot Trudeau.” Montreal: Vintage Canada, 2009. p.p. 79

English, John. Just Watch Me: The Life of Pierre Elliot Trudeau.” Montreal: Vintage Canada, 2009. p.p. 81

Rotstein, Abraham. Power Corrupted. The October Crisis and the Repression of Quebec,. Toronto: New, 1971. p.p. 22

English, John. Just Watch Me: The Life of Pierre Elliot Trudeau.” Montreal: Vintage Canada, 2009. p.p. 83

English, John. Just Watch Me: The Life of Pierre Elliot Trudeau.” Montreal: Vintage Canada, 2009. p.p. 83

Tetley, William. The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010. p.p. 71

Tetley, William. The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010. p.p. 91

Tetley, William. The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010. p.p. 113

Tetley, William. The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010. p.p. 42

Bouthillier, Guy, and Edouard Cloutier. Trudeau’s Darkest Hour: War Measures in Time of Peace, October 1970. Montréal: Baraka, 2010. p.p. 94

Bouthillier, Guy, and Edouard Cloutier. Trudeau’s Darkest Hour: War Measures in Time of Peace, October 1970. Montréal: Baraka, 2010. p.p. 176