War Zone Campaign Doctrine History Essay

INTRODUCTION

1. The PLA has been undergoing the “Strategic Transition” from preparing for an “early, total and nuclear war” in 1985 to a “local and limited war” in the current context. The PLA understanding of the nature of these future local wars has been greatly influenced by the 1991 Gulf War and the experiences of 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. PLA planners believe that future local wars will be a medium sized local war which could involve large scale sea crossing and amphibious landing operations, counter offensive operations in the border regions and repelling local foreign invasion. These wars are likely to manifest in wars involving national unification and disputes over maritime and land boundary issues.

PREVIEW

2. The WZC concept was first recorded in 1979 when an adhoc operational area command was formed during the Sino- Vietnam war. It is a doctrine developed for future military operations to be conducted in China’s strategic neighbourhood as a limited war fought under Joint HQ. It entails limited objectives, greater central control with political settlement as the end result and considerable preparation. In order to develop an understanding of the concept, this paper is laid out as under:-

(a) Historical and Theoretical Perspectives of Chinese War Strategy.

(b) Chinese Views on the Characteristics of Future Wars.

(d) Evolution of Chinese Mil Doctrine.

(e) War Zone Campaign.

(f) Interpretation of Terms at Operational / Campaign level.

HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

OF CHINESE WAR STRATEGY

3. Transformation of the PLA. After Mao’s demise in 1976, saw the re-emergence of Deng Xiaoping. Under his political leadership, the military became disengaged from civilian politics and resumed the political quiescence that characterized its pre-Cultural Revolution role. Focus of military modernization was the reform of military organization, doctrine, education and training, and personnel policies to improve combat effectiveness in combined-arms warfare and the transformation of the defense establishment into a system capable of independently maintaining a modern military force. The reforms were implemented in the PLA from 1978-85.

4. In 1985, the Enlarged Central Military Commission (CMC) endorsed Dengs shift in strategic thinking from preparing for an all out war to preparing for a local war. It carried out a review of sit and threats and concluded that there existed NO threat of early war, however a general war which could have a nuclear backdrop (nuclear war) was very much imminent.

5. In 1995, the Enlarged Central Military Commission (CMC) meeting chaired by Jiang Zemiin officially adopted the “Two Transformations” (liangge zhuanbian) as the policy for “army building” to guide all aspects of PLA reform. It called for the Chinese army to undergo a metamorphosis from an army preparing to fight local wars under ordinary conditions to an army preparing to fight and win Local Wars Under Modern High -Tech Conditions; and from an army based on quantity to an army based on quality.

6. Key PLA Teachings on Military Strategy. In 1987 “Science of Military Strategy” was published by Academy of Military Sciences which reflected change in strategic thinking from total war to local war. It was for internal circulation (neibu) to all officers at the divisional level and above. This, however, offered limited approach to strategy and was primarily based on People’s War Under Modern Conditions (PWUMC) using positional and mobile warfare along with combined arms operations. It relied heavily on Soviet based invasion setting.

7. In 1999, post Gulf War I, “Science of Military Strategy” was re-published by PLA National Defence University (NDU) and formed the core teaching text for Strategy Course at NDU. The salient highlights were the broader approach to strategy, covering a range of contingencies under modern hi-tech conditions and covered a range of varied objectives, intensity and lethality. This was followed by publication of “Study of Campaigns” in 2000. In 2001, AMS published open (gong kai) version of “Science of Military Strategy” in Chinese and, in 2005, the English version of the book was published.

8. Theoretical Perspective. In general terms, China’s military doctrine can be divided into four levels as under:-

(a) Junshi Sixiang (Military Thought).

(b) Zhanlue (Military Strategy).

(d) Zhanshu (Military Tactics).

9. Military Thought. This forms the foundational principles and concepts of war fighting and military struggle. It gives out the basic views for guiding and planning the overall situation of military struggle. However, specific guidelines or rules for conducting military operations are not specified. The concept of strategic thoughts is closely linked to Mao’s military thought and some of the relevant concepts include Active Def and People’s War.

Military Strategy

10. Military Strategy, as per the NDU, is defined as “planning and guidance for the overall situation of military struggle, including planning, deploying and guiding the construction and use of military force, to reach the effective achievement of a stated political goal”. It is described as a trinity comprising of Strategic Goals (zhanlue mudi) – Ends, Strategic Guidelines (zhanlue fangzhen) – Ways and Strategic Means (zhanlue shouduan) – Means. Strategy links Military Thought and Campaigns by providing general guidance for planning and conduct of military operations. The scope of Strategy includes

(a) Threat Assessments.

(b) Overall Strategic Goals.

(d) Basic Principles for conducting military struggle.

(e) Means, methods and coordination of military struggle.

11. Strategic Goals. Strategic Goals determine the ultimate political objective in any struggle and thus is linked to national interest. Strategic Missions (zhanlue renwu) are the operational tasks required for achieving strategic goals. Strategic missions and strategic goals are the comprehensive reflection of Strategic Circumstances (zhanlue xingshi) including the main features of international strategic situation and National security requirements. The focus of Strategic Goals during wartime includes operational aspects such as maintenance of initiative, destruction of enemy force. In peacetime, it is to safeguard national interests such as using military means to create deterrence for a stable external environment.

12. Strategic Guidelines. Strategic Guidelines consist of general principles and programs for guiding overall situation of a military struggle. It is a closest analogue to operational doctrine, though at strategic level only, as opposed to campaign or tactical level. Past strategic guidelines include People’s War Under modern Conditions and the current one being Local Wars under Modern High Tech Conditions. Organizational and operational modernization requirements for a force are determined from identification of appropriate strategic guideline.

13. Strategic guidelines stipulate the following: –

(a) How to complete a strategic mission.

(b) How to realize the strategic goal by identifying key points of struggle.

(d) Identification of Strategic deployments.

14. Strategic guidelines are generally composed of five components: –

(a) Identification of Strategic Opponent. It is based on the threat to national interest and the operational threat is based on the specific military nature of threat.

Strategic Direction. It primarily identifies the focal point of struggle and the centre of gravity for use of force to decisively shape the struggle.

Basic Points of Preparations for Military Struggle. This refers to the type of struggle e.g. nuclear vs conventional.

Basic Methods of Military Struggle. This includes

Types of Struggle. Combat Operations vs Deterrence.

Types of Strategic Operations. Offense or Defence.

Main Operational Forms. Mobile Warfare or Positional Warfare.

Types of Operations. Blockade or Ambush.

(e) Guiding Thoughts and Principles for use of Military Force. This includes the options of Striking first or second (xianfa zhiren, or houfa zhiren) and Fighting a Protracted Warfare or Quick Decisive War.

15. Strategy manifests in General (zong) or Specific Strategic Guidelines (juti zhanlue fangzhen). The WZC doctrine is a strategic guideline for Local War Under Hi-Tech Conditions (LWUHTC).

16. Strategic Means. Strategic Means spells out ways and methods of using military force to achieve an objective – what and how to use including military and non-military means. This can be carried out in basically four ways which include: –

(a) Actual combat operations in general or local war.

(b) Deterrence operations which is the primary method to be used during peace time.

(d) Combat readiness exercises including force build up, strategic troop transfers, adjustments in deployments, military exercises, weapons tests and war preparation tests.

17. Spheres of Military Strategy. There are three identified spheres of military strategy: –

(a) Wartime Strategy (zhanzheng shiqi de zhanlue). This refers to periods of time when society as a whole deals with war, such as general war e.g. countering an invasion as the only type of general war China might face.

(b) Peacetime Strategy (heping shiqi de zhanlue). This refers to periods when nation is not in a general state of war. Peace should not be confused with absence of future conflict, but LOW LIKELIHOOD of general war. It includes: –

(i) Deterrence operations.

(ii) Crisis managment.

Local war.

(c) Local War Strategy (jubu zhanzheng de zhanlue). This is a special type of problem that occurs during peacetime. It has been defined as “war with limited objectives in a part of an area where limited armed force is used”.

18. Traditionally Chinese Strategy has laid much emphasis on the “initiative”. Hence, the strategy advocated is pro-active vis-Ã -vis reactive. Successive literatures on strategy have also re-emphasized that the “operational” or “campaign” level of operations is the most productive and rewarding for achieving political aims. The strategy adopted must be futuristic and support future national aims or roles. It must factor in economy of options and weigh the cost-benefit evaluation of war i.e. whether to go to war and how best to profitably conclude it. The stated doctrine must also conform to China’s image and position of assertiveness after ‘century of humiliation’. In order to ensure “no direct threats to China” there is a deliberate effort to gradually move towards “capability – driven” from “threat-driven” which has been a fallout of emerging international / regional situation.

CHARACTERISTICS OF FUTURE WARS

19. Characteristics of Future Conflict. Some of the assessed characteristics of future conflicts are as under:-

(a) Future conflicts will be restricted in their scale, means and timing of war.

(b) Objectives would be often political / diplomatic rather than military in nature.

(c) Conflict processes will be under greater centralized control and political settlement will invariably be the end result.

LEVELS OF CONFLICT

20. Levels of Conflict. The levels of conflict assessed to occur in near future are as under:-

(a) National Level. A national level conflict would involve national mobilization of resources. It will be characterized by centralized control by the CMC. The objectives and decisions in such a case would be strategic in nature (zhan lue xing).

(b) Theatre level. A conflict at theatre level would involve the Military Region (MR) / MRs. The battle area under such circumstances would be called War Zone Front and overall control will be exercised by nominated MR / HQ.

(c) Campaign Level (corresponds to own “operational” level – zhanyixing). A campaign level operation would involve Combined Arms Gp Armies (CAGA) or gps of CAGAs (corps equivalents / groups of these). The area of conflict is termed as campaign zone (qu). In peacetime, the area of battle maybe under a Military Region or part of it; in wartime, however, it would be referred to as war zone. The outcome of WZC directly affects realization of national strategic objective. Equivalent weightage is given (employed as appropriate to mission) to all four services.

EVOLUTION OF PLA DOCTRINE

21. The PLA Doctrine has evolved over the years commencing from its basic aim to defeat the Nationalist forces to ensuring territorial integrity and subsequently as a tool for diplomacy and external relations. It has transformed itself as under:-

People’s War (Pre – 1949 till 1960). The People’s War doctrine, was the result of lessons learned from the War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945), and emphasized the preparation of masses of foot soldiers and militia to engage in prolonged guerrilla warfare in China’s vast interior. This era also marked the looming threat of total, nuclear war and the Chinese capabilities being almost defensive against any strategic nuclear attack. The Chinese strengths basically included space and people and hence basic Strategy involved mobilization of population, trading time for space and final counter-offensive to annihilate the enemy.

(b) People’s War under Modern Conditions (PWUMC). (1960 to 1985) This change in doctrine was a result of the changed perceptions post Sino-Soviet split in 1960. The strategy aimed to develop capability to check aggression forward to gain time for national mobilization and People’s War. The Chinese strategy during the period was aimed at defeating a Soviet type invasion before it could penetrate deeply into China. It envisaged a forward defense that is near the border, to prevent attack on Chinese cities and industrial facilities, particularly in north and northeast China. Such a defense-in-depth required positional warfare, much closer to the border, in the initial stages of a conflict. This strategy downplayed the people’s war strategy of “luring in deep” in a protracted war. It also took into account the adaptations in strategy and tactics necessitated by technological advances in weaponry.

(c) Limited War (jubu zhanzheng) Under Hi-Tech Conditions (LWUHTC) (Post-1985). This was promulgated after Deng’s call for a review of the existing strategy. This came into being due to reduction in the Soviet threat due to Sino- US entente, the demonstration of hi-tech weapon systems employed in the Gulf War I and the post-liberalized growth of Chinese Comprehensive National Power (CNP). The strategy placed reliance on small, effective, hi-tech capable, tri-service integrated troops. It also stressed the need to fight away from borders or exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

(d) Limited War under Conditions of Informationization (LWUCI). This f irst found expression in 2004 White Paper. Informationisation was to be treated as a Force Multiplier and it sought to integrate all available platforms or assets. This is also in consonance with development of Chinese infrastructure and capabilities in their efforts to undergo RMA.

WZC – THE PLA’s DOCTRINE

FOR

CAMPAIGN IN WARZONES

22. WZC. War Zone Campaign as a doctrine evolved for conducting a limited war under high technological conditions. Future campaigns under the doctrine will be fought by combined arms synergy applied under unified joint command and control HQs. Such a HQ is created in theatre of operations by pooling in resources from Mil Region HQs and offrs from Gen Staff Department. WZC is an intermediate between Combined Arms GA (CAGA) army dominated command and total war where more than one war zones are activated simultaneously. Salient characteristics of the WZC are as under:-

(a) The doctrine has been developed by PLA for future wars which are going to be limited wars and conducted in peripheral regions under a joint HQ.

(b) It is a joint services campaign and an intermediate between military region and national (CMC) level campaign.

(c) WZC is designed for a local / limited campaign but however its outcome determines realization of national objectives.

(d) PLA Mil Regions already have AF / Navy on their orbat or under operational control.

(e) PLA traditionally has been Mil Region-centric. WZC envisages imposition of another higher HQ to:

(i) Coordinate employment of troops of more than one Mil Region.

(ii) Act as CMC representatives for employment / control of tactical, strategic and nuclear missiles.

As it involves more than one MR, theatre-wide control, coordination and deception is ensured by imposition of this HQ.

A recent example is of the Taiwan straits incident when the PLA was engaged in large scale exercises and firing rockets across the Taiwan Strait in 1996 when Gen Kui Fulin from GSD was superimposed on Nanjing MR and Guangzhou MRs and formed the Fujian Front.

23. WZC in the Level of Conflict. WZC is an intermediate between Combined Arms GA (CAGA) army dominated command and total war where more than one war zones are activated simultaneously. In the spectrum of Level of Conflict it is short of a national mobilization but more than CAGA ops.

PARTIAL MOB

OR

TOTAL MOB

WZC

COMBINED

ARMS

GP ARMY

OPS

Salient Features of the Doctrine.

The doctrine envisages combined arms and joint service operations.

In depth strike. Aim is not to engage enemy at forward positions but in depth through infiltration, forced penetration, air projections and flank intrusions.

There is a requirement of professionally and technically qualified person to operate high tech advance equipment.

It envisages mastery in outer space.

Delegation of command to lower commanders as severe hindrances / loss of command during operations is envisaged.

It places great emphasis on C4ISR systems.

Interpretation of Terms. Certain important terms used in definition of the doctrine are as under:-

(a) Local and Temp Superiority (LATS) – Concentration of Force at point of decision.

(b) Trans-Regional Sp Ops (TRSO) – Flexibility.

(d) Quick Battle, Quick Resolution (QBQR) – Simultaneity of ops, Non-Linearity, Tempo (Speed, Momentum).

(e) Elite Forces, Sharp Arms (EFSA) – Appropriateness, Economy of Effort.

26. Implementation of WZC. The basic aim of WZC is to turn PLA inferiority into superiority by three pronged strategy namely Elite Forces Sharp Arms (EFSA), Gaining Initiative by Striking First (GISF) and Quick Battle, Quick Resolution (QBQR). These are deliberated upon in succeeding paras.

Elite Forces Sharp Arms (EFSA)

27. Elite Forces Sharp Arms (EFSA). What justifies EFSA is that limited nature of local war makes it possible to achieve local and temporary superiority through the concentrated use of the EFSA. The use of EFSA can be optimized by their deployment, coordination and command.

EFSA

Dply

Coord

Trans Regional

Sp Ops (TRSO)

Dply per se

Comd

28. Deployment. A relatively new concept in this aspect is the Trans Regional Sp Ops (TRSO). Its implication at campaign level and at strategic level is as explained below:-

(a) At Campaign Level. Deployment of EFSA must be with the aim to achieve ‘comprehensive strike effects’, and for this forces must be carefully selected. The principle also advocates ‘Dispersed deployment’ of optimal forces to deny enemy ‘window of vulnerability and increase survivability of own forces and to achieve ‘concentration of effects’ by concentrating destructive effects of these arms and forces which is the basic prerequisite for achieving local and temporary superiority.

(b) At Strategic Level. It envisages deployment of the best available forces and arms from other Mil Regions to reinforce war zone where local war may occur. Such a trans regional support operation (TRSO) has many advantages:-

(i) It enhances political and diplomatic initiatives.

(ii) Avoids sustained force deployment but optimizes readiness in the rear.

(iii) RRU/RRFs ensure indirect forward presence by utilizing mobility.

(iv) It may also prevent escalation as also enable local and temporary superiority in psychological terms.

29. Coord. Coordination of sub campaigns is a must to achieve synergy of effect w/o inter service friction. It is aimed at permitting service commanders to coordinate and control respective services sub campaigns. As EFSA is associated with technology intensive services [RRF, Special Ops Forces (SOF), Navy, AF, Sec Arty] the relationship between services / branches has to be defined by equality and partnership in a joint services campaign. Hence coordination of joint service campaigns is a crucial issue for successful conduct of WZC.

30. Principles of Coordination of Joint Campaigns.

(a) Coordination is centered on whichever service that conducts the sub campaign. It calls for a heightened sense of responsibility and initiative by service commanding officers.

(b) An important aspect for coordination is the timing and manner of transition from one phase of the campaign to another for example from electronic to air sub campaign, to sea denial and crossing operations, then to amphibious landing and ground operations. The coordination between various services is also very important during transitions to reduce internal chaos and friendly fire casualty.

(c) Coordination in stratagem (e.g. outflanking troop movement to divert enemy forces to secondary fronts) is important to determine whether local and temporary superiority will be achieved on the primary front.

(d) A common method of coordination is mutual dispatch of service representatives to coordinate air-land, air-sea or sea – land operations.

(e) Modes of coordination are strike zone based, target based and timing based.

(f) Most important coordination mechanism is establishment of joint force command.

31. Principles of Command. A joint command is established with deputy commanding officers from Air force, Navy and Sec Arty. The joint command formulates joint services operational plans and conducts inter service coordination. Some issues related with command are as under

(a) Extent and Timing of Centralised Command. Command must be centralised during planning. However during execution, a decentralized command and service autonomy are desirable.

(b) Traditional Mil Region command organs are ground force dominated and hence could be a potential for inter service friction during implementation.

(d) The joint command may have higher proportion of command and staff officers from services other than the army as necessitated by the requirement..

32. Trans Regional Sp Ops (TRSO).

(a) This deals with concentration of EFSA at strategic level.

(b) It aims at deployment of best forces and arms from other Mil Regions to reinforce the War Zone e.g. Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF), missiles, AF etc.

(c) It focuses on development of rapid reaction forces and capabilities in the rear while maintaining a moderate level of forces deployed forward.

(d) It contributes to achievement of local and temporary superiority.

(e) TRSO stresses on tech – based mobility and effectiveness to achieve its aim.

(f) Enhances political and diplomatic initiatives by maintaining reduced forces in the fwd areas and de-escalating tensions.

33. Capabilities: RRF.

(a) Adaptation and responsiveness are the two key elements of RRF.

(b) It is intended for quick reaction to deal with internal security (IS) and local / ltd border conflicts.

(c) These forces are maintained at full strength with all terrain and all weather capability including survival training for 48 hours.

(d) They have the capability to reach anywhere in any Mil Region within 24 to 48 hours.

(e) RRFs of 15 AB Corps can reach anywhere in China within seven days.

Gaining Initiative By Striking First (GISF)

34. Gaining Initiative By Striking First (GISF). Increased precision and lethality of high tech weapons causes unprecedented destruction. Under such conditions the side that strikes second may lose momentum and face the prospects of defeat. As also the demarcation between first and second strike will be less relevant and hence by carrying out first strike a local and temporary superiority may be achieved. However, first strike may not lead to temporary initiative if the enemy is well prepared and anticipates the strike. This can be ensured by element of surprise and initiation of the initial battle of the campaign. GISF is hence associated with the beginning of the campaign.

Gaining Initiative by Striking First

Element of Surprise

Initiation and Initial

Battle of the Campaign

Note: China will not be averse to striking first ?

35. Element of Surprise. There are two key issues while considering Element of Surprise. If adversary is well prepared and anticipates strike, effect is reduced hence the need for element of surprise. There is a requirement of identifying enemy intentions and capabilities and simultaneously concealment of PLA intentions and capability. This can be achieved by concealing the real and demonstrating the false by employing conventional / asymmetric, electronic and civil-military means.

(a) Transparency of En Intentions and Capabilities.

(i) At the Strat Level. This can be achieved through long term, systematic and institutionalized study and analysis of military target especially with regard to his war fighting doctrine, styles, command, organization and weapon systems.

(ii) At the Campaign Preparation Level. This can be achieved by acquiring and affirming intelligence with regard to the enemy by continuously monitor enemy movement, weapons and targets by the use of satellites, surveillance ships, planes, radars, radios and human intelligence.

(b) Successful Concealment of PLA’s Intentions and Capabilities. Modern technology enables effective surveillance and difficult concealment. Non tech means employed in 1991 Gulf War resulted in successful concealment achieving local and temporary superiority. Also fighting the battle close to China’s borders would increase success of concealment.

36. Methods of Concealment. Some of the measures which may be employed to confuse the adversary about timing, place, scale, nature and direction of the campaign initiation are:-

(a) Create a situation of internal intensity and external relaxation i.e. political and diplomatic means be employed to conceal strategic intentions.

(b) Concealing the real (hiding real forces by camouflage).

(c) Demonstrate the false (use of dummy planes, ships, tanks, vehicles, artillery pieces and use reserve militia to show false deployment).

(d) Blending the real with the false and illusory with the substantial (mixing real and substantial forces with false and illusory ones, meshing forces with civilian facilities).

(e) Electronic measures (ECM, deception, ECCM).

37. Initiation and Initial Battle of the Campaign.

(a) There is a contradiction between active defence as a central principle of PLA military operations and first strike (GISF in fact becomes a central component of active defence).

(b) “Window of opportunity for first strike” is the period between the failure of political and diplomatic initiatives at the strategic level and completion of enemy deployment – “between the en’s strat choice and his strat probe”.

(c) The outcome of the first battle would be crucial to determine whether local initiative is seized or not and hence it is necessary to “Throw a powerful and superior initial strike force into the initial battle”.

(d) In order to maintain the advantage created by the initial battle, resolute, active and continuous offensive must be carried out to deny enemy breathing space.

Quick Battle Quick Resolution

38. If GISF is the beginning of the campaign, QBQR is the conclusion. QBQR deals with prosecution and conclusion of the campaign. The importance of QBQR arises from the fact that border wars fought for disputed territories will be limited to a confined area and not for total conquest of a country. Hence, there is a need to contain the conflict and achieve final resolution at one stroke. QBQR seeks to avoid prolonging of war as (high tech weapons would also cause extensive damage to own military and civil infrastructure in the event of a prolonged war. As the PLA is deemed inferior in technology, the enemy may regain and counter strike to cause PLA a defeat if war is protracted.

QBQR

INFO OFFENSIVE

OFFENSIVE OPS

MOB

FIRE POWER

AMBUSH

SOFT KILL

HARD KILL

CONTINUOUS

DEEP STRIKE

VERTICAL STRIKE

MOB SURPRISE ATTACK

39. Methods to Achieve QBQR. Mobility and Offensive operations are the two key concepts to achieve QBQR.

40. Mobility. Mobility is a pre-requisite for carrying out continuous and dynamic offensives. Mobile Warfare is dependent on good infrastructure and complex logistics but these leave adequate signature for the enemy to pick up. Whether local information superiority can be achieved will determine whether QBQR can be realized in PLA’s favour. Counter reconnaissance is advocated to achieve information superiority (neutralise en’s C4I by use of anti svl satl measures, laser and kinetic energy, particle beam wpns and other measures) which also helps in achieving surprise. There is a need to mitigate threats to mobility from air by integrated air defense measures required to defeat over-the-horizon (OTH) beyond-visual-range (BVR) missiles and their launch platforms, smart bombs, stealth tactical aircraft and attack helicopters (AH).

41. Modes of Mobilization. Employing various modes of mobilization may enhance deception or reduce exposure and casualty, thus improving the odds of local and temporary initiatives. These include

(a) Exterior Line Mobilization. This involves establishment of one or several inter-connected mobility corridors with local security umbrella when campaign forces are to move. These are outside but close to exterior flank of the enemy when enemy is deployed concentrated, battle field is large and time is sufficient. It is carried out to create momentum. It may not be always possible to conceal this and may be supported by small scale mobilization to divert attention.

(b) Interior Line Mobilization. This is carried out through gaps in enemy’s deployment. It is conducted when favourable opportunities have been created with concrete targets.

(c) Leap Forward Mobilization. In this case forces are dispersed and organised into smaller more agile tactical units that take many routes. It envisages simultaneous move in darkness. It leads to lower force density, less exposure time, small mobile columns which enhances survivability and speed of mobilization.

42. Offensive Ops. Surprise Attack (SA) has been the conventional mode of conducting PLA offensive while ‘Information Offensive’ is the new mantra for conducting PLA offensive operations. There are three types of SA incl Firepower SA, Ambush SA and Mobile SA.

(a) Fire power SA. This is based on concentrating effects of conventional strategic or tactical missiles, bombers or attack air craft and campaign or tactical artillery. These attacks will be sudden, concentrated and brief or continuous for a limited period of time. It is not restricted by distance, easy to organise, command and control. However as it cannot capture territories, it is conducted for battle field denial, interdicting sea / air transport, strike political, economic and military targets.

(b) Ambush SA. The purpose of an Ambush Attack is primarily to deal with enemy mobile forces. Such attacks can be applied from pre-concealed, pre-deployed forces close to the zone. It may combine capabilities of air / land fire power, force mobility and assault when applied on to the enemy. For this ambush area must be fairly large to enable mobility of forces. The ambush forces may be deployed away from the area and close in at the last moment. It can only achieve local superiority by rigorous preventive measures against enemy mobile forces, air and other counter ambush methods.

THE WZC DOCTRINE FLOW CHART

44. Military resolution of any conflict begins when diplomacy fails. The military resolution follows almost an identified path and is diagrammatically represented in the schematic below. The WZC aims to create a sub path within this schematic so as to enable military resolution in the minimum time period and the most economic method. It aims to prevent escalation of the conflict and hence relies on a methodical application of military resources to inflict “The Crippling Surgical Strike” so as to bring the enemy on its knees and compel it to negotiate from a position of disadvantage. Schematically the WZC can also be understood as the portion of the diagram below highlighted in the L-shape. As the initial strike has to be crippling, it will invariably call for a detailed preparation including keeping the enemy guessing to achieve surprise. The details of preparations that the PLA is likely to carry out are shown in the boxes in blue colour. The WZC doctrine will aim to follow the highlighted path but if the first strike does not achieve its aim of crippling the enemy, then it may escalate the conflict at its conditions to primarily bring the enemy to the negotiating table. Should the escalation fail to bring in any effect then the conflict resolution would follow the conventional path of resulting in a large scale all out war. Salient aspects of the same are discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

DECISION

IDEN OBJ

PREP

ACTIVITIES

SHAPING

ENVIRONS

POSN

TPS/

RES

SHAPE

BATTLEFD

D DAY

CAPTURE

OBJ

NEGOTIATE

REACT/

ESCALATE

CONT

ESCALATION

ESCALATE

FOR

EFFECT

TERMINATE

CONFLICT

UNILATERAL

WITHDRAWAL

OF TPS

DECISIVE

MAJ

WAR

YES

NO

YES

The WZC Path

45. Decision. Decision making is reflective of the national level synergy. The decision-making is carried out by the PBSC. As there are limited layers of decision making, namely the PBSC, CMC, PB (and most of them have common members), it de-facto results in centralization. Decisions arrived do not suffer from dilution or have minimal or no risk of dilution due to populist reasons. This is a major advantage as it enables easy capitalization of China’s unique position regionally and globally.

46. Identification / Selection of Obj. Once the decision to raise the ante for a conflict has been taken, identification and selection of suitable targets naturally follows. The targets selected are unlikely to be those that require major national mobilization, protracted period of operations if escalated and those that call for a Fight to Finish or threaten the core. Some of the reasons are due to possible interdependence of the two economies being neighbours , ramifications of the conflict on world and subsequently Chinese economy. The targets would be evaluated for its effect on the neighbourhood both in respect of Chinese need for “peaceful development” and the effect of “China threat” that it would generate. The target selection would also factor the use of nuclear weapons and the aspect of mutually assured destruction in such an event.

47. Likely Characteristics of Selected Objectives. The objectives likely to be selected for the initial crippling blow are ones which have easy recognizability in public consciousness to drive home the point and ensure institutional memory of the consequences of any misadventure. The selected objectives could have historical claims or be an extension of their ethnic association. It should be unheld / lightly held by the adversary. It should not be at a depth vis a vis Chinese troop locations i.e. shallow in enemy territorial depth. The target in addition to the strategic / operational payoffs would invariably result in political spin-offs e.g. to resolve the Tibetan problem or to enhance influence over other countries of the subcontinent.

48. Preparatory Activities. Preparations are going to be the major effort in implementing the WZC doctrine. These activities would leave many a tell tale signs of an impending strike. Activities likely to be undertaken as part of preparation for a potential conflict are optimization of infrastructure to support the offensive in likely Firm Bases. It would result in collection of Intelligence using satellites, UAVs and Human intelligence. It would also activate the PLA dedicated military C4ISR systems in efforts to prepare and dominate the electromagnetic spectrum. Some visible signs could be the familiarization and training for contingencies by nomination of troops / reserves. The training could be carried out in similar terrain in depth. It would also manifest in manipulation of internal environment by Casus belli e.g. creation of justifiable cause for prepositioning troops in TAR. The alibi could also explain the justification for induction of out-of-theatre troops.

49. Shaping the Environment. Shaping of the environment is important for successful application of WZC. This is likely to manifest in the synergized application of economic, political and diplomatic resources. It would manifest in unhesitant use of political / economic / diplomatic pressures to prevent third-party interference in the conflict. The efforts would aim to utilize regional / global influence to maximize effect. With increasing reach of the PLA Navy, use of maritime resources to get international community to exert pressure on the adversary can not be ruled out.

50. Shaping the Battle Field. Prior to engaging in the battlefield, the Chinese will carry out actions to shape the battle field to its advantage. This would be heavily dependent on isolating the objective by electromagnetic, cyber and physical means. It could call for employment of EW / IW measures to achieve isolation of the nominated objectives. To ensure surprise, the PLA would carry out Strategic Deception manifesting in internal intensity but external tranquility. Once the war is joined in, the battle field would be shaped by use of resources to carry out battle field interdiction. The aim in such cases would be to limit exploitation of limited routes of induction / buildup by the adversary, prevent inter-valley move by disruptions along the choke points and employment of variety of means including missiles, air and artillery resources.

51. Controlled Escalation. This would only be resorted to when the initial aim of bringing the enemy to its knees and forcing him to the negotiating table fails. The aim of such escalation continues to be to bring the enemy to the negotiating table at the earliest and prevent the conflict from reaching the full blown out stage calling for a fight to the finish. In the event of failure to capture initial objectives and force a negotiation, the decision to escalate the conflict would be evidently visible in nuclear signaling and threat. There could be visible move / redeployment of strategic weapons to support the operations. The Trans-regional support operations (TRSO) being executed would involve movement of troops from other Mil regions not involved so far. It could also manifest in preparation / positioning of Air-Borne forces if not utilized till now. All this actions would also be carried out simultaneously with offers to negotiate and even backdoor diplomacy.

52. Escalation for Effect. In the failure of the show of strength and threat by controlled escalation, the Chinese will escalate the conflict for effect. The conflict then moves out of the purview of the WZC and would follow the conventional path as shown in the diagram. It would be evident in Chinese commencement of interdiction in depth using conventional war head missiles, air / space weapons and coordinated actions by insurgent groups. The Chinese would also carry out counter value strikes in retaliation to own strikes. The conflict would result in a large scale national mobilization effort to bring about a decision. The tenets of WZC herein after such an event may not be applicable as the war is no longer a limited war but a national effort.

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